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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROLE OF REAR-SERVICES BRANCH DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 80
pp 1-16

[Article by Lt. Gen. Bui Phung: "The Army's Rear Services Work in the Enterprise of Defending and Building the Homeland"]

[Text] On 11 July 1980 the rear-services branch commemorates the 30th anniversary of the day President Ho Chi Minh signed the order establishing the Supply General Department of the Vietnam People's Army. For more than 30 years our army's rear-services branch, under the wise leadership of the Party Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh, and with the all-out assistance of the people of the entire nation and the participation of the entire army, has fulfilled all missions assigned to it, and in doing so has built an increasingly stronger rear-services organization and cultivated the corps of rear-services cadres and personnel, who are increasingly numerous and are of increasingly higher quality. The experience in rear-services work, especially experience in the art of commanding rear services, in building material-technical bases, and in building up the organization of the rear services sector, that has been accumulated during the past several decades has been extremely valuable, and has contributed to further enriching our nation's treasury of experience in armed struggle.

The all-encompassing and outstanding lesson during the past several decades has been that it is necessary to fully understand the political, military, and economic lines of the party, firmly grasp the military tasks of the revolution and the combat tasks of the army in each period of time, and firmly grasp the creative, unique military art of Vietnamese people's war in the new era, and on that basis mobilize and organize the entire population and the entire army to manifest a spirit of revolutionary offensive, create combined strength, create a solid rear-services battlefield position, and enable the rear-services branch to advance to a professional, modern status.

After the great victory of the anti-U.S. resistance war, our country's revolution entered a new phase, the phase of building and defending the socialist homeland. Our soldiers and people must oppose a new enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are plotting to weaken and annex our country. We must meet the new, very difficult requirements of the enterprise of defending the homeland and

developing the nation, while at the same time consolidating the new, very great capabilities of an independent, unified nation which is advancing to socialism, in order to meet those requirements. The army's rear-services branch must apply and develop past experiences in a manner appropriate to those new requirements and capabilities, in order to fulfill the increasingly difficult missions assigned by the party, the state, and the people.

I

Fully Understand the Basic Viewpoints of the Party in the Enterprise of Defending the Homeland and in the Rear-Services Work

The resolution of the Fourth Party Congress delineated the revolutionary line in our country during the nation's new era. Then, the resolutions of the Central Executive Committee and the Political Bureau concretized the party's revolutionary line and set forth the methods for organizing implementation. Militarily, the Fourth Party Congress brought up very basic matters. On the basis of those matters, and also of the actualities of the struggle to defend our homeland, especially the developments of the border wars to the southwest and north against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the Central Executive Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central Military Party Committee have resolved a whole series of basic problems regarding the development of national defense by all the people, the development of the people's armed forces, and the waging of people's war to defend the homeland. The rear services branch must fully understand the political, economic, and military lines of the party, and firmly grasp the problems of military science and art in war to defend the homeland if it is to correctly resolve its actual short-range and long-range problems.

1. Fully understanding the viewpoint of national defense by all the people in the period of building and defending the homeland.

During the past several decades of liberation war and war to defend the nation, the army's rear-services branch has gained much valuable experience, including experience in serving the great undertaking the socialist north. Today, the rear-services branch must serve the enterprise of developing and consolidating the national defense of the nation under conditions which differ from those of the past and which are also very different from those of other countries, including the fraternal socialist countries. Only by fully understanding our party's line on national defense, which is based on our country's actual conditions, can we do a good job of the rear services work.

The rear-services branch must serve the construction of our national defense with the objectives of solidly defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland, contributing to defending the national independence and socialism of the Indochinese countries, preserving peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world, and being prepared to defeat the aggressive wars of all enemies, under any circumstances, no matter what kinds of weapons they use, even weapons of mass destruction. That is a national defense of all the people, one that is comprehensive and modern and is tied in with the strength of militant solidarity and special friendship with the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea on the Indochinese Peninsula. In their enterprise of developing and defending their homeland, our people also have the great support and assistance of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the progressive people of the world.

In serving the construction and consolidation of such a national defense, the rear-services branch must be developed on a large scale, with great and increasingly strengthened material resources, in accordance with the new strategic deployment and by means of appropriate formulas.

We must have all-round, long-range viewpoints, calculating the requirements of the next few years while taking future years into full consideration and including the units all over the country, from north to south, both the units fulfilling missions in our country to units fulfilling international obligations in Laos and Kampuchea, in the common struggle against the aggressors. There are new requirements not only regarding quantity but also regarding the quality of the rear services work. The great increase in the quantity of materiel itself results in new requirements in the rear-services branch's management, distribution, and utilization. The outstanding development of the technical equipment, organization, and operational art of our armed forces also necessitates higher quality in all aspects of the work of the rear-services branch. Service to armed forces branches and technical combat arms, and units with less modern or primitive equipment. The requirement of the rear-services work is that it must support activities in the air and at sea under the conditions of our skies and seas being vast and extremely complicated in comparison with the requirement of serving units operating on land.

The deployment of the rear-services material bases must be appropriate to the new strategic deployment of national defense of all the people, and in correct accordance with the party's economic and defense policies. The rear services branch must serve the creation of economic and defensive strategic areas and the defensive lines, bases, and rear services facilities of the nation and of each theater, on land, along the coast, and at sea, and in both the mountain areas and the lowland areas, with very different requirements for the various areas. In developing the provinces and municipalities into strategic units and the districts into military fortresses, and in developing integrated combat clusters in the districts, the rear services branch has a very great responsibility. It must support the development of standing forces and reserve forces during peacetime and make strategic preparations for war.

Carrying out the rear-services work on the basis of the nation's new combined strength, and on the combined strength of the new regime, the new economy, the new culture, and the new socialist man is a new developmental step of our viewpoint of rear services by all the people in the enterprise of defending the homeland. The resolution of the Fourth Party Congress clearly stated that "The mission of constructing and consolidating national defense is a mission of the entire population, the entire army, and the entire proletarian dictatorship, under the leadership of the party." That is also a very basic viewpoint which must be fully understood by the rear services branch in order to achieve rear services by all the people. The rear-services work must be based on the system of socialist collective mastership and on the process of simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions on a national scale, in the armed forces, and in the rear-services sector, in order to create resources, develop resources, and contribute to creating material resources for rear services. It must, by mobilizing and organizing cadres, enlisted men, personnel, and organs, contribute positively to creating and developing latent capabilities in order to strengthen the nation and national defense. In combination with the development of latent economic strength, latent political-morale strength, and scientific-technical strength, it must develop the people's

collective mastership role to create a basis for the movement for all the people to create a system of rear-services organizations of all the people, while also creating and developing the mastership role of the entire army on the rear services front. Only thereby can it develop, mobilize, and use all latent capabilities of the nation, of all the people, and of all sectors in the state and collective economic sectors, at the front and in the rear, etc., in order to resolve the new problems that have been posed with regard to the rear services work.

2. Fully understand the viewpoint of people's war and firmly grasp the military science and art of people's war to defend the homeland.

It is necessary to do a good job of the rear-services work in building and consolidating national defense, in order to prepare for war to defend the homeland and create favorable conditions for the rear services work in wartime.

War to defend the homeland today in some respects is similar to, but in some respects differs from, the recent liberation war. The experiences of the rear services work in the liberation war must be applied and developed in a manner appropriate to the new conditions of war to defend the homeland. War to defend our homeland is all-round, modern war of all the people, but the "all the people, all-round, and modern" contents encompass new contents which are based on the new, continually developing political, military, economic, and social conditions of our country, and are based on the new historical background of the world situation in the "post-Vietnam" period, when we are opposing a new enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, in league with the U.S. imperialists. As the art of waging war develops the rear-services work must also develop in order to effectively serve the war.

The rear-services work must serve the attainment of our combined strategy in war to defend the homeland and ensure that the entire population -- of whom the people's armed forces are the hard core -- fights the enemy. It must be based on the combined strength of the system of socialist collective mastership, which was gradually developed in the pre-war period and continued to develop in wartime, in order to develop the material capabilities of the entire nation and of each locality, and in order to help the various kinds of troops to defeat the enemy as soon as they start a war of aggression, as soon as they set foot on our territory and throughout the war, in all areas of our country.

The rear-services branch must fully understand the concept of strategic offensive, effectively help the various kinds of troops achieve firm mastery and attack strongly, in accordance with the very creative contents which our party has delineated and which are deployed in battlefield positions on the defensive lines and in the tactical art of the armed forces. It must provide material back-up for both wars fought by main-force units and local people's war, enable the units and localities develop their strength and defeat the enemy under all circumstances, and help the various kinds of forces and types of troops to hold their ground for a long time, move rapidly, and operate in the various types of campaigns and with the many tactical forms of war to defend the homeland. The front line must be sufficiently strong to defend the area of operations and continually annihilate the enemy, and the rear area must have resilience and continually aid the front line while being prepared to fight the enemy on the spot.

The rear services work and the rear services branch must have plans to meet stipulations regarding reserve forces and to materially supplement the units and localities fulfilling combat-readiness and combat missions in the various areas. They must develop the strength of the entire nation; the rear echelon must aid the forward echelon; and the rear areas must serve the front line. All echelons must develop its greatest strength and exploit to the maximum all capabilities of the local rear services. The localities and areas in the strategic rear must be prepared with regard to material-technical facilities, so that when war breaks out all places can be capable of defeating the enemy on the spot, doing a good job of defending the locality, and giving effective assistance to the front and to the other localities. They must pay attention to maintaining sufficient reserves and promptly resupplying the forces fighting behind enemy lines.

3. Fully understand the viewpoints of combining national defense with the economy in peacetime, combining service to combat with construction and production in the course of war, and emphasizing economy in construction and combat.

The rear-services branch of today must not only "receive from above and distribute below." but must also "make things to use."

In peacetime, the rear-services branch must contribute to ensuring that troops engaged in economic work attain the highest effectiveness, organize their own production, exert the greatest possible effort, and ensure that the units everywhere maintain high degree of combat-readiness while training well and producing well, in accordance with specific, appropriate requirements and norms stipulated by the upper echelons.

During wartime, in the rear echelons -- in places in the strategic rear area -- it must maintain combat readiness while positively producing to serve the front and meeting the increasingly greater requirements of the battlefield. There must be meticulous plans to protect production and the supply depots, to prevent the enemy forces from inflicting damage.

Under all circumstances, the rear-services branch must give material support to all troops engaged in construction, training, and production, in order to contribute to economic construction and socialist construction.

At present, the national economy is encountering difficulties caused by the after-effects of war, by the fact that the economy is still largely one of small-scale production, and by deficiencies in our organization and management. At the same time, the requirements of the task of providing material-technical support for national defense and for the armed forces is very great, complicated, difficult, and urgent. Therefore, we must manifest a spirit of self-reliance and pay all-out attention to economizing in construction and combat and in all national defense expenditures.

In doing rear-services work we must have truly profound understanding of the general situation of the nation at the present time and endeavor to overcome the difficulties. There must be close and urgent guidance of the fulfillment of the mission of producing foodstuffs, consumer goods, and other goods in the rear-services branch and throughout the armed forces, in order to create an increasingly greater source of materiel. Attention must be paid to creating sources of

supply, and initiative must be shown in seeking out, developing, and rationally using all sources of materiel, and effort must be made to accumulating and rapidly building up material reserves, in order to create solid support capability at the various echelons. It is necessary to strengthen management, achieve absolute economy in using manpower and materiel, and develop to the highest degree the effect of the material-technical bases. Research must be undertaken in order to fully utilize the capacities and capabilities of equipment and facilities for combat and daily living. We must fully utilize the capacities of technical, specialized equipment and use rear-services materiel rationally, with high effectiveness, and economically but still do a good job of supporting the armed forces engaged in construction and combat.

In addition to organization, attention must be paid to doing a good job of teaching awareness of economy to the troops and the national defense workers and personnel, emphasize the spirit of self-reliance and of respecting and treasuring public property, and know how to fully utilize all sources of supply, including materiel that we produce or capture, restore sources of supply taken from the enemy, etc. We must resolutely struggle to overcome all instances of depending on others, lax management, damaging or losing materials or property and all instances of negativism, corruption, and waste.

II

Do a Good Job of Fulfilling the Urgent Rear-Services Tasks at Present

On the basis of the viewpoints presented above and the urgent present requirements, we must closely guide the organization and implementation of the following urgent rear-services tasks:

1. Creating solid sources of rear-services support.

This is a key matter which has a decisive significance with regard to creating capability and productivity for, and assuring the quality of, the rear-services work and the rear-services branch. In doing rear-services work, it is necessary first of all to fully understand what support capabilities there are and where the materiel and manpower can be obtained to give that support. Under the new conditions of the present war to defend the homeland, our ability to provide rear-services support is dependent principally on the support capabilities of the national economy, which is gradually being developed in the process of national construction, and on the great assistance of the fraternal socialist countries. Today, the task of organizing rear-services support for the armed forces must be based essentially on sources of material-technical support in the nation's rear area, and must be supplemented by means of other sources, including what is produced by the armed forces themselves and what is captured from the enemy.

The source of support for the nation's rear area is the state, which represents the people in providing support for the armed forces. It is the basic, permanent, most important source of support and supplies practically all types of materiel for daily life, facilities, equipment, materials, technical means, fuel, etc. Our state is also greatly assisted by the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist nations. The various echelons must draft plans and establish relationships with

the state organs and sectors, in accordance with the support responsibilities of each echelon. They must coordinate closely and promptly resolve all problems which arise in the implementation process, in order to meet all supply norms of the unit plans.

The support of the collective economic units (including the production, commercial, and service bases), as well as the direct support of the local people for the troops, are important parts of the nation's source of rear-area support. The exploitation and good utilization of those sources is essential in order to strengthen and supplement the permanent sources of support and overcome difficulties in the organization of rear-services support in the units.

The production of the armed forces is extremely important, especially in the present situation of our nation, which is experiencing economic difficulties but must maintain a strong, combat-ready standing army. The armed forces must engage in production in order to meet part of their material needs. No matter what the circumstances, in peacetime as well as in wartime all units, no matter what missions they are fulfilling, in the rear or at the front, must organize the production of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and the necessary rear-services materiel, add to materiel reserves, and create conditions for the coordination and stabilization of the rear-services support work.

Materiel captured from the enemy is also a notable source of support, and sometimes becomes an important means of on-the-spot supply during combat. We must have good organizational measures in order to fully collect and distribute that materiel and utilize it rationally and economically.

All of those sources of support are important, and have their strengths and uses. Each rear-services echelon and support branch must positively be concerned with creating sources of support, firmly grasp the capabilities and strengths of each source, and closely combine the various sources; fully develop the on-the-spot material-technical capabilities of the state sectors, collective economic bases, popular masses, and localities; receive and stockpile the support sources of the upper echelon; and organize production to create sources in the rear-services sector and in the armed forces, in order to take the initiative in solidly and permanently organize rear-services support.

2. Deploy forces and create a solid rear-services battlefield position.

To organize and deploy forces, and create a rear-services position in today's war to defend the homeland is to organize rear-services support in the various areas. In order to create area rear-services support positions we must combine the economy with national defense, combine the state sectors with the army's rear-services forces, the army's rear services with the people's rear services, and the central-level rear services with the local rear services; utilize the support sources and rear-services forces that have been created; and combine on-the-spot exploitation or stockpiling with the support sources and the rear-service forces that are sent from other areas. Only thereby can we enable all areas of the nation to be capable of assuring a high degree of independence, to be integrated with the neighboring areas, and to be prepared to aid one another when necessary and form a solid, integrated rear-services battlefield position in each area as well as nationwide.

By organizing rear-services support according to areas we will not only be capable of overcoming difficulties regarding complicated terrain, limited communications and transportation, and the fact that each operational area is easily cut off during war, but also capable of effectively coping with an enemy invading our country from many directions and develop the combined strength of people's war and the material-technical strength of the entire population, in order to support all operational modes of the armed forces. That will support prompt, continuous, and widespread fighting against the enemy attacking from the various directions, while preparing the battlefield with regard to rear services and assuring that the mobile forces of the various echelons enter the fighting rapidly and conveniently.

Organizing area support manifests the combination of positions, fronts, and echelons in a solid integrated position in each area of operations, each locality, and nationwide. In an area, to combine positions, fronts, and echelons is to combine all rear-services organizations and forces in that area and to integrate the rear-services bases of all echelons with all support forces of the army people in that area, and closely combine the support networks with one another by means of complete communications-transportation systems in the area.

The organization of rear-services support according to areas must be implemented at all echelons -- strategic, campaign, and tactical -- and it is necessary to closely combine the rear-services areas and rear-services support bases of each echelon, combine those of the upper echelons with those of the lower echelons, and create a solid integrated position at each echelon and among the echelons. The rear-services organizations and forces of each area of operations must be formed into all-round support networks, and closely combined with the networks of material-technical bases of the sectors in the localities.

The deployment of transportation forces and facilities must also be based on the communications-transportation networks in the areas in order to form integrated communications-transportation battlefield positions at each echelon and among the echelons.

The rear-services battlefield position must be solid and must be defended under all circumstances, but it must also be very mobile, be capable of being transformed very flexibly, and continually provide rear-services support for the armed forces under all circumstances.

In modern warfare, the rear-services work is a fierce contest against the enemy. The destruction of our rear-area bases and rear-services forces is always a strategic plot of the enemy. When invading our country, the Chinese reactionaries tried every insidious plot to destroy our rear-services bases and forces. At the front as well as in the rear we must do a good job of defending the rear-services organs and bases. Under all circumstances we must place the matter of maintaining secrecy and defending the rear-services organs and bases in the forefront. We must both strengthen our efforts to teach vigilance to the cadres, enlisted men, workers, and officials, so that they correctly implement the counter-espionage and secrecy-maintenance rules and regulations, while also maintaining close relationships with the localities and relying on the on-the-spot armed forces in order to grasp the political situation and participate in maintaining local order and security. Especially, it is necessary to pay all-out attention to organizing combat against the airplanes, spies, air landings infantry, and commandos, and counter disturbances in our interior, in order to protect the rear-services bases and forces under all circumstances.

3. Create national rear-services support nodes.

With regard to the rear-services support nodes, it is necessary to correctly resolve the relationships between combining the economy with national defense, the state with the army, the upper-echelon with the lower-echelon, and the on-the-spot forces with the mobile forces. We must closely combine and develop to a high degree the capabilities of the sectors and forces, in order to organize the full, prompt, and most economical support for the construction and combat of the armed forces. Our country is now unified and is constructing socialism, and all production and economic construction and economic construction activities, as well as all rear-services activities, must be carried out according to plan. The armed forces are in the process of promoting professional, modern development, so all construction, combat, support, and other activities must be carried out according to unified plans, orders, statutes, and regulations. Therefore, the matter of creating nodes for assuring that professional, unified rear services has become an urgent requirement in building up the rear services branch.

On-the-spot support is a node for assuring basic rear services that appeared immediately after our people's armed forces were formed. On the basis of directly assisting the revolutionary masses, we must develop all material-technical capabilities in each area of operations of the troops, in order to carry out all aspects of the support work. In the rear areas we have exploited and utilized the latent on-the-spot material-technical resources in order to accumulate and stockpile materiel on the spot and build on-the-spot rear-services bases, so that the armed forces may take a stand and operate on each battlefield and in each area. That was a successful experience of the rear-services work during the recent war to liberate and defend the nation.

Support facilities brought in from other areas have also been a node of basic rear-services support that has taken form in the process of developing the organization, and raising the operational level, of our armed forces. On the basis of the material-technical forces that were developed, exploited, accumulated, and stockpiled in the rear area and in the rear area and in the systems of rear-services organizations of the various echelons during the recent war we successfully carried out the movement of materiel from distant rear areas to support the front, even during the course of the fighting. With the employment of that node, the rear services were capable of giving increasingly solid, continuous support to armed forces which were operating on an increasingly greater scale, were becoming increasingly mobile, and were using increasingly modern technical equipment, especially in large-scale coordinated campaigns involving armed forces branches and combat areas.

Combining on-the-spot support with support brought in from other areas to form rear-services support bases on self-sufficient areas is a basic rear-services support mode that is manifested specifically in the rear-services work by means of the concept of rectory and offensive, offensive and rectory of people's war in our country. It is being widely applied, at a time when people's war is developing more and more and when our armed forces have become large and strong and can rely on a rear area that has been solidly constructed and consolidated in each theater as well as nation-wide. It accomplishes the close combination of the on-the-spot rear services of people's war in all areas with the over-all strategic rear area of the nation, while also meeting the requirements of strengthening the capabilities of the on-the-spot rear-services forces, in combination with the capabilities of the

material-technical forces sent by the upper echelon, in order to form a rear-services support structure based on self-sufficient areas. That is the most positive, solid, rapid, and timely organizational measure to create conditions for the armed forces to have a firm base of on-the-spot support and fight the enemy in all areas of operation, while preparing the battlefield with regard to rear services for the mobile main-force troops in the various theaters.

That mode of area rear-services support is universal in all theaters and areas of operation, but it must be applied flexibly. It is necessary to, depending on the specific situation in each area, in each period of time, and with regard to each type of materiel, determine what areas and what type of materiel, during which period of time, is to be based primarily on on-the-spot resources or resources brought in from other areas. If that is to be accomplished, we must pay such attention to, and do a truly good job of implementing, the promotion of production and the creation of solid on-the-spot sources of supply, so that they may be available and be capable of rapid mobilization. On that basis, all matters regarding the deployment of rear services material-technical bases and the support organization of each sector must be carried out on the basis of self-sufficient areas, so only that mode of support can fully develop its positive effect in war.

In order to do a good job of implementing those basic rear-services support modes, it is necessary to firmly grasp the principle of the upper echelon supporting the lower echelon and the upper and lower echelons working together, while also developing the responsibility of each echelon in organizing support and implementing unified standards and regulations throughout the army. On the basis of unified standards and regulations we must provide material support and have the upper echelon provide the most essential materiel while the units purchase or make some of what they need, and advance to providing complete material support with regard to all types of rear-services materiel.

4. Strengthen and rectify rear-services management.

Rear-services management is a very important part of military management and contributes greatly to maintaining and increasing the combat strength of the armed forces. Rear-services management must create conditions for the most rational, scientific use of all rear-services capabilities and forces, in order to meet as well as possible the construction, combat, and production requirements of the armed forces. Rear-services management is the science of organizing and using the rear-services forces and guiding the rear-services work in a professional manner, in accordance with the lines and policies of the party and state, in order to fulfill the rear-services mission with high productivity, good quality, and the greatest possible effectiveness, and with the least expense and most economical use of manpower and wealth, in both organizing support and producing support materiel. The strengthening and rectification of rear-services must be carried out in all branches -- the quartermaster, military medicine, cantonment, POU, transportation, and other sectors -- in all types of rear-services base-level units: warehouses, enterprises, hospitals, construction sites, military stations, truck units, etc., and in all aspects: plans, labor, materials, finance, technology, etc.

The strengthening and rectification of rear-services management includes many contents:

Rectifying the organization of rear-services support, stabilizing supply organization, ensuring the stipulated standards, organizing sources and creating a solid support status, organizing uninterrupted circulation and distribution, reducing intermediaries, and avoiding round-about routes.

Rectifying the organization of production, the creation of sources of support in the armed forces, the full utilization of the capacities of equipment, land, materiel, and manpower, rapidly increasing production, lowering production costs, and improving product quality.

Improving the quality of rear-services planning, mastering the situation, the needs, and the capabilities, and not permitting the work to become passive or resolving problems in a patchwork manner.

Rectifying the statistical work, organizing monitoring, firmly grasping all situations, doing a good job of drafting plans and drafting and gradually completing the system of norms and standards to serve as a basis on which to gradually plan the rear-services work.

Creating scientific, professional management modes for all aspects of the rear-services work; gradually abandoning the unconditional request-and-receive support method, implementing the method of support based on standards, fixed quantities, and regulations, with calculations of effectiveness and tight control; gradually abandoning, and ultimately abolishing, the system of "administrative supply"; and implementing the system of "economic accounting," accompanied by the utilization of a system of economic levers in production.

Increasing consciousness and implementing the policy of strict economy in support as well as in production in order to create sources.

The tasks of creating sources, building a battlefield position, improving support modes, and strengthening management are closely interrelated, stimulate one another, and create a complete rear-services system. Therefore, at all editions and in all aspects of the rear-services work it is necessary to do a good job of that work in order to create a mobilized strength for the rear services branch and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of service to the troops.

III

Building a Strong Rear- Services Organization

In building rear-services organizations it is necessary to fully understand the party's line toward building the people's armed forces. At the same time, it is necessary to firmly grasp the basic viewpoints regarding the rear-services work, on the basis of the rear-services branch's mission in the enterprise of defending the homeland.

The over-all direction is that it is necessary to positively advance the army's rear-services organization from the status of an organization serving troops who are fulfilling the mission of defending the homeland to one of a rear-services organization of a powerful revolutionary people's army which has an increasingly

highest level of professionalism and modernity, and which is both prepared to fight to fight and build up the armed forces while doing production labor and economic development and fulfilling national and international missions. We must build a rear-services branch that is strong in all respects, along revolutionary, professional, main-line, and in accordance with our party's viewpoints regarding combined strength and all-round quality. It must be strong politically, ideologically, organizationally, and with regard to material-technical capability, the science and art of commanding and managing rear services and technical facilities, and ability to organize and implement, on the part of everyone and of individual rear-services cadres, enlisted men, and personnel.

Central-level rear services (strategic rear services) must be developed into an organ capable of serving as an effective staff for the Central Military Party Committee and the Ministry of National Defense in the rear-services sphere; of guiding material support for the armed forces branches, combat arms, main-force units, and local units throughout the nation; of organizing and managing a complete rear-services system from top to bottom; and of directly organizing and guiding rear-services support for people's war fought by main-force units (principally mobile strategic main-force units), and giving effective support for local rear services, in order to provide material-technical support for local people's war. Central-level rear services must have strong forces; have skilled research, guidance, and executive organs; have a scientific, professional work style, have complete material-technical bases; have strong support capability; be deployed in strong positions and adhere closely to the theaters (strategic areas); have large campaign units capable of providing prompt, continuous support for the armed forces in wartime; and be capable of supporting the front lines of our forces in all operational areas.

Military zone rear services (usually campaign-level rear services), the rear-services organization in a theater (strategic area), must have strong, complete organization, forces, and bases capable of providing rear-echelon rear-services support for campaigns commanded by the military areas, and capable of, along with the central-level rear services, supporting the large campaigns carried out by the main-force units.

The rear services of the armed forces branches and combat arms directly under the Ministry of National Defense must be built up so that they may be up to their function of serving as staffs for central-level rear services in organizing and commanding specialized rear-services support throughout the armed services. The rear services of armed forces branches and combat arms must organize forces that are complete as regards the various aspects of specialized material-technical support and the other aspects of supporting the units under their control. Their organization is simpler, for they have the assistance of the general support organizations of the central level and the rear services of the military areas.

Division rear-services (usually tactical rear services) must be strong enough to directly support the units fulfilling all combat missions, and must develop the strength of the cadres and enlisted men participating in the rear services work.

The provincial, municipal, district, and city rear services must be improved so that they can do a good job of guiding organizing support for the local armed forces and supporting the fulfillment of all local missions serving national defense and

the front line, while doing a good job of fulfilling their staff function for the local party committees and governmental administration in mobilizing and organizing the entire population to do rear services work, creating people's rear services, and preparing on-the-spot rear services for the various kinds of troops operating in the locality.

In addition to building up the army's rear services and developing the role of the people's rear-services organization, consisting of forces which defend the material-technical bases of the organs, the base units of the state sectors (the production, circulation, and service sectors), and the collective economic organizations and broad popular forces in the localities which participate in providing rear-services support for the armed forces. The people's rear-services forces must be organized extensively and formed into tightly led organizations at the various echelons to, along with the army's rear services, form the powerful rear-services forces of people's war in our country. Within the sphere of locality, people's rear services must be combined with local military rear services to form local rear-services forces at each echelon. Therefore, in order to have a strong rear-services organization it is necessary to build truly widespread people's rear services organizations and greatly strengthen the local military rear-services organization. We must build and consolidate the people's rear-services organization at the base level (people's rear-services committees of the villages, wards, organs, enterprises, construction sites, state farms, state forests, etc.), and the rear-services councils (supply councils) at the district and provincial levels, in order to mobilize all local material-technical capabilities and forces to serve the war. We must closely combine the people's rear-services and the local rear-services with the army's rear services in the support organization of the armed forces, while building and mobilizing the reserve forces in order to supplement the army in wartime. These are essential, pressing tasks which must be carried out very urgently in order to quickly form a complete support network in the nation and in each locality, in order to promptly meet all wartime needs.

In order to build strong rear-service organizations we must build a truly strong corps of rear-services cadres, enlisted men, and personnel.

The corps of rear-services cadres, enlisted men, and personnel are part of the corps of cadres and enlisted men of the People's Army, and must be developed in accordance with the standards regarding cadres and enlisted men in the People's Army. It must have sufficient numbers and high quality, so that it may meet the requirement of building rear-services organization at all echelons, have strong standing forces and strong reserve forces, have good political quality, and be capable of acting skilfully, in order to be appropriate to the responsibilities and missions of each sector, echelon, and person. Each sector and echelon has its own requirements, so we have here only presented some of the most general requirements regarding all cadres and enlisted men of the rear-services branch.

As people who directly provide material support for units defending the homeland, the cadres and enlisted men of the rear-services branch must above all be absolutely loyal to the homeland and the people, manifested in a concentrated way at present in very strong determination and in great creativity in meeting all requirements of the construction of a national defense of all the people and people's war to defend the socialist homeland. They must have profound hatred of the enemy and determination to defeat all plots and schemes of the Chinese expansionists and neogonists.

who, in league with the U.S. imperialists, are seeking to weaken and annex our country. They must have ardent socialist patriotism, a noble spirit of socialist collectivism, profound consciousness of strict organization and discipline, have consciousness of close cooperation, and have consciousness of uprightness, justice, and impartiality. Under all circumstances, no matter how difficult and arduous, rear-services cadres and enlisted men must have all-out love for their comrades, treasure the people, share each grain of rice and salt, correctly implement the systems and policies of the party and state, deliver all necessary materiel to the consumers, and not waste or squander even the slightest bit of public property.

The actualities of several decades of building our army's rear-services branch demonstrate that a meticulous process of steeling is required to produce a pure and virtuous cadre or enlisted man of the rear-services branch. Since they are people who provide direct material support under the circumstances of our country being poor and devastated by war, and being continually attacked by the enemy, difficulties are being encountered in the lives of the people in general and the families of the cadres and enlisted men in particular, to struggling victoriously against material seductions is a manifestation of revolutionary reason and sentiment. Loyalty to the homeland, to the party, and to the people is not manifested in strange ways but in loyalty to one's responsibilities and missions, and to the standards of comrades and fellow unit members. The sweat and tears of the people, the bloods and bones of our compatriots and comrades, the concern of the party and state, the international sentiment of our friends everywhere, etc., may be said to be a part of each kilogram of cargo. If rear-services cadres and enlisted men are able to fully understand the great moral value represented in the material value of that kilogram of cargo, then no shady thoughts can creep into their heads, and they will perform no negative act.

At the same time, the rear-services cadres and enlisted men, especially the cadres, must be fully qualified to meet the requirements of the present missions of our army's rear-services branch. They must fully understand the political, military, economic, and social lines of our party, fully grasp the military science and art of people's war to defend the homeland, and fully understand, and contribute to creating and developing, the science and art of organizing and commanding our rear services. They also must have knowledge of military science and art and much other knowledge in the social and natural science spheres, for only then can they meet the steadily developing requirements of our cadres and enlisted men. The cadres and enlisted men of the professional, modern people's army's of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are new people created by our regime, are steadily undergoing all-round development, have broad cultural knowledge, and have increasingly high aesthetic needs in their lives and even in combat, training, and production activities. The material and moral requirements are combined intimately with one another and are increasingly demanding. They must ensure that our troops are gradually provided with sanitary food and drink, have ample living quarters, have warm and attractive clothing, and are organized and neat in the camps, on the road, on the practice fields, and even on the battlefield. That amounts to a science which sets new, very high requirements for the rear-services cadres and enlisted men in everything from research to organizing implementation. We cannot be satisfied with the previous and present organizational methods, but must advance. We must apply more and more scientific-technical accomplishments to the task of improving the troops' living conditions. It should not be thought that only

political cadres need understand psychology, or that only management cadres need have knowledge of physiology. In rear-services support, in units with similar material bases and similar conditions of material support, because of different levels of knowledge their members may create different kinds of housing and messing, and therefore create different psychological attitudes (and psychology cannot be separated from physiology), which leads to different results with regard to service.

The above-mentioned matters regarding the moral qualities and abilities of rear-services cadres pose many problems regarding the training and cultivation of rear-services cadres. We must improve the quality of training and cultivation both in schools and in actual work, in order to build an increasingly stronger corps of rear-services cadres to serve as the hard core in building a strong rear-services organization.

In the new situation, the mission of the rear-services work is to support the armed forces in construction, combat, combat readiness, production, economic development, the fulfillment of international obligations, and preparations to defeat the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists. Those missions are extremely difficult and urgent.

We must improve productivity, quality, and effectiveness of all aspects of support and production to create sources of support; promote the construction of a comprehensively strong rear-services branch; and resolutely overcome all negative, backward manifestations in order to enable the rear-services work to advance rapidly and solidly. Those are very urgent objective requirements. An extremely important objective requirement for victoriously leading and guiding the rear-services work and building up the rear-services branch is strengthening the leadership of the party committees and develop the effectiveness of the command echelons. It is necessary to fully understand the political, economic, and military in the new phase; firmly grasp and creatively utilize the principal guidance thoughts and viewpoints of the party regarding the rear-services work; and firmly grasp and organize the good implementation of the basic matters of most decisive significance in organizing support and building up the rear-services sector. That is a practical way to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the day Uncle Ho signed an order establishing the rear-services branch, and to strictly carry out his precious instructions regarding our army and our rear-services cadres and enlisted men.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION BY NATIONAL DEFENSE SECTOR DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 80 pp 31-38

[Article by Le Hien: "The National Defense Production Bases and the Task of Developing the Consumer Goods Industry"]

[Text] The Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (Fourth Term) issued a resolution regarding the urgent situation and tasks, and a resolution regarding the direction and tasks of the development of the consumer goods industry and local industry. In those resolutions, the matter of developing the consumer goods industry occupies an extremely important position, and it has become an urgent economic task in the present situation.

In order to closely and urgently guide the implementation of that policy of the Party Central Committee, the national defense factories must firmly grasp, and do a good job of resolving, the following problems.

- I. Clearly Recognize the Position of the Consumer Goods Industry and the Responsibility of the National Defense Factories Regarding the Development of the Consumer Goods Industry

The party's economic line confirmed the important role of the consumer goods industry is, along with agriculture, serving as a basis on which to give priority to the development of heavy industry and to carrying out socialist industrialization in our country in the initial phase of the period of transition from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production. In the present situation, the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee once again stressed the profound economic and political significance of the consumer goods industry.

Developing the consumer goods industry is an extremely important and urgent task of all sectors and echelons, in the short range as well as in the long range and in peacetime as well as in wartime, in order to implement the resolution of the Fourth Party Congress and the victorious implementation of the three general tasks in the new situation: stepping up production and stabilizing and maintaining the

people's living conditions; strengthening national defense, security, and combat readiness, and defending the homeland; and accumulating capital and building the material-technical bases of socialism. The strong development of the consumer goods industry will contribute positively to the full utilization of social labor and promote the division of social labor, develop the sectors and trades and rapidly increase production for society, meet the needs in the lives of the people, and increase exports and capital accumulation for socialist industrialization. By means of processing, the consumer goods industry increases the utilization value and value of agricultural, forestry, and fishing products. If the consumer goods industry is developed, a source of rear-services supply for the people's armed forces will be ensured.

The direction for developing consumer goods production, as clearly indicated by the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the production of consumer goods must be based on the consumer goods policies, which for the present are:

- The consumption of society must be based on domestic production, and we must oppose dependence on foreign consumer goods.
- Attaining the goals of having enough to eat and warm clothing to wear, and extolling the spirit of frugality and simplicity.
- Encouraging the use of goods produced in our country and in the localities, and produce good products for export.

With regard to all consumer needs of the people, no matter how minor, we cannot allow shortages to exist when there are conditions in our country for meeting those needs.

In order to implement those policies, it is necessary to comprehensively develop all of the principal sectors of the consumer goods industry, in order to create a complete structure. But during the next few years we must concentrate on developing the sectors with urgent needs, such as those processing foodstuffs, producing consumer goods from domestic raw materials (wood, paper, textiles, leather, soap, porcelain, glass, rattan and bamboo, rush mats, etc.), and producing the principal consumer goods (coffee, tea, rubber, raw silk, tobacco, pineapples, shrimp and squid, contracted-out textiles and ready-made clothing, artistic handicrafts, etc.).

The national defense forces consume rather great quantities of goods and also are very capable of contributing positively and directly to the development of the consumer goods industry to increase the output of goods for society and meet some of their own needs.

For many years now, a number of factories, enterprises, and production bases in the armed forces have produced a rather large assortment of goods essential to the lives of the troops and the people, and products serving industry and agriculture which require rather complicated technology, such as some types of vehicle and machinery spare parts, electric motors, lathes, cement equipment, machinery to process foodstuffs and vegetable essence and oil for export, etc. In 1978, Factory No 17 produced a number of goods in rather large quantities: bicycle brakes and pedal housings, enamelware kerosene stoves, aluminum pots, and enameled steel

bowls. In 1978, although it had only begun to trial-produce plastic basins for the troops, Factory No 76 produced tens of thousands of pairs. Factory No 31 within a 2 year period produced hundreds of plastic canes of the various types, and briefcases. A number of enterprises of Military Region 8, although experiencing difficulties regarding raw materials, during the first 6 months of 1979 was able to produce tens of tons of soap, Honda motorbicycle and bicycle tires, plastic, and tens of thousands of wooden crates for export, and also processed tens of tons of dried foodstuffs, the various kinds of fish sauce, tapioca flour, corn, and industrial bran. The bases of the organs units, armed forces branches, combat arms, military regions, corps, provinces, and districts throughout the armed forces that produced ready-made clothing, wooden items, construction materials, pharmaceuticals, etc., contributed positively to providing consumer goods for the armed forces and the people.

Although the level of production is still low in comparison to the requirements and does not yet correspond to the latent capabilities of the national defense sector, it has increased the troops' supplies and alleviated the difficulties of the state.

The positive and direct participation of the national defense sector in the sphere of consumer goods production has become very important and urgent. Even though it is maintaining a high degree of combat readiness and is urgently engaged in construction and other work, the national defense sector still must do a good job of fulfilling its production missions. In addition to promoting the production of foodstuffs the sector must positively ensure that its material-technical bases of the consumer goods industry develop and directly produce consumer goods, including those meeting food, clothing, and housing needs, household goods, and those having to do with travel, culture, education, public health, construction materials, and export. In order to attain that objective, during the next several years we must have policies and measures to immediately and rationally mobilize the entire sector, especially the factories, enterprises, and production bases, to develop the trades and essential goods for the troops and people.

Each rear-services and technical sector, as well as each unit and locality, must, depending on its combat-readiness mission, produce in order to serve national defense, and on the basis of its strong points determine and develop appropriate sectors, trades, and products.

II. Do a Good Job of Organizing Production and Organizing Production Management

The organization of consumer goods production must depend on each product and be based on the economic effectiveness and flexible application of the appropriate forms of production organization -- national defense, collective, or individual -- in order to produce many products for society. That production organization viewpoint of the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee must be applied toward organizing consumer goods production in the national defense sector first of all and principally in order to fully utilize all production capabilities and develop to the highest degree the spirit of initiative and creativity of the masses and of the existing production units and bases. If it is necessary to construct new bases, it is necessary to calculate the capital and raw materials that will be supplied, after the capabilities of the existing bases have been fully developed.

Therefore, the technical and rear-services branches, the organs and units, and the localities must investigate and very tightly grasp the present production capabilities of each specific sector and production unit, in order to determine appropriate forms of production organization and plans for producing consumer goods. Not only the large industrial factories with modern technology, but even the national defense machinery repair units and stations of the general departments, armed forces branches, combat arms, corps, military areas, provinces, districts, divisions, and regiments are capable of making certain contributions to the production of consumer goods. The production organization forms that are selected need not be fixed, but may change according to the special characteristics of the sectors and trades and level of economic-technical development, in order to serve production as effectively as possible. It is essential that each production plan that is drafted be appropriate to the all-round capabilities of each production unit and be in agreement with the production directions and objectives of the state and of the Ministry of National Defense.

The national defense industrial factories and enterprises must have plans to fully utilize the surplus capacities of their machinery, equipment, and waste materials, and local raw materials, to produce consumer goods, after they have fulfilled their national defense production plans.

The enterprises, factories, and production bases which specialize in the production of consumer goods for national defense must be closely guided and must urgently implement the current resolution of the party central committee regarding the production of consumer goods, with a new spirit and with better ability and effectiveness than in the past. We must strengthen the management work and the scientific-technical work in order to raise the level of specialization of the sectors and trades, with the objective of producing many goods with good quality and low production costs.

In developing consumer goods production we must oppose "closed circuits" in the national defense sector and in individual units. We must expand division of labor and cooperation among the enterprises and factories in the sector and between national defense on the one hand and the economic and cultural sectors, and the localities, on the other hand, in order to overcome difficulties and develop the strengths of the organizational network of national defense industrial production and of the national network of industrial production organization, and attain high economic effectiveness.

Fulfillment of unified plans, from the rear-services and technical sectors to the base-level production units. We must resolutely oppose arbitrary working methods, the drafting of plans without realistic bases, doing the easy and neglecting the difficult, working in the "drifting along with the current" manner, having enthusiasm but achieving nothing, or wasting manpower and wealth. We must, on the basis of making inventories and firmly grasping all of our labor, materials, and equipment, as well as all sources of supply of the state and the localities, in order to draft good utilization plans, absolutely develop all production capabilities, increase labor productivity, and develop production.

Plans for the production of consumer goods by national defense industry must manifest the relationships between national defense and the economy, and between the specific interests of the army and the general interests of the state. The

consumer goods production plans of each national defense industry factory and enterprise must be closely combined with the plans to produce military goods to form a unified, complete system of plans, and the economic-technical factors must be ensured. If the national defense factories, enterprises, and production bases specializing in the production of consumer goods take on the production of consumer goods for the economic and cultural sectors and the localities, they must be included in the units' over-all plans.

In order to facilitate the drafting and implementation of production plans and attain good economic effectiveness the production bases must have a strong sense of self-reliance and correctly exercise their right to take the initiative in production and commerce, and their right of financial autonomy, as stipulated by the state and the Ministry of National Defense. Furthermore, they must strengthen their sense of responsibility in guiding and assisting the production bases, so that they may be able to fully develop their production capabilities and their initiative and creativity in production.

A matter of no less importance with regard to the management of consumer goods production is that in addition to rapidly increasing quantity it is also necessary to continually improve product quality, for that is a matter of important economic and political significance. There must be production management policies and measures to ensure that consumer goods production fulfills both the quantitative and qualitative requirements, is not done carelessly, and does not waste raw materials or create bad habits in production and management.

III. Strictly Carry Out the Party's Economic Policies and Positively Research Science and Technology and Apply Them to Production

In the production of consumer goods, economic policies play a very important role. Therefore, we must strictly and creatively carry out the stipulations of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee regarding the amendment and improvement of the current policies, above all the good resolution of four important policies: the raw materials policy, the export stimulation policy, the policy toward local industry production, and artisan industry and handicrafts production, and the distribution and circulation policy. Those are effective economic policies which are intended to enable consumer goods production to take off in the right direction.

Therefore, although the characteristics, conditions, circumstances, and requirements differ, the national defense sector must very closely and urgently guide the implementation of those Central Committee policies and create favorable conditions for the factories, enterprises, and production bases so that the entire army can promote production.

The investment policy must be extremely economical and rational. It must resolutely concentrate the capital of the state and the Ministry of National Defense on the key sectors, trades, and installations with demanding, complicated technical requirements. It must also seek all ways to mobilize the existing capital of the entire sector and the bases in the production of ordinary goods, and fully utilize improved and simple technology. It must correctly combine vertical investment with horizontal investment. In the immediate future, emphasis must be on vertical investment.

in order to reequip and expand the existing production bases, and complete and balance the production lines, in order to fully utilize the capacities of the existing equipment.

In order to develop the consumer goods industry, a matter of decisive importance at present is the creation of sources of raw materials and fuel. The overall, most practical and effective, direction for resolving that problem is to mobilize forces to promote agricultural, forestry, and fishing production in the spirit of the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee. In addition to stepping up production to produce raw materials and fuel, it is also necessary to absolutely attain the slogan of economy in the use of raw materials and fuel. All of the production bases must seek ways to recover and fully utilize all sources of waste materials and waste products in the production, circulation, and consumption process. That is a major problem which must be fully understood, and there must be many policies and measures to resolve it. Attention must be paid to organizing transportation, storage, and the avoidance of damage and losses. Materials must be tightly managed, in accordance with norms. We must improve product design and apply advanced techniques in order to economize on materials in all production units. We must produce by using a variety of raw materials, and not allow raw materials to stagnate. All units must pay attention to creatively and effectively applying the principle of substituting raw materials when quality requirements permit, such as substituting inexpensive raw materials in place of expensive raw materials and substituting domestic raw materials for imported raw materials.

During the past several years, a number of enterprises, factories, and production bases in the armed forces have performed that task well, so they have continued to produce even though they encountered difficulties and shortages regarding raw materials. In 1978, factory No 31 used more than 80 tons of waste plastic, worth more than 2 million dong, in production. Every year tens of tons of scrap aluminum are used to make military and civilian cooking pots and equipment for communal messhalls, valued at more than .5 million dong. The aluminum alloy bicycle brakes produced by factory No 17 are also produced from scrap metal. Factory No 76 used 10,000 kilograms of surplus plastic reinforcing material of the various types in production. Within the first six months of 1979, factory Q165 used to produce components for various state products waste materials worth 42,000 dong. The wounded soldiers' screw enterprise of the Capital Military Region uses steel shavings left over after screws were turned to produce 200,000 bicycle brake calipers, 10,000 small electric fan shafts, etc.

In order to attain high productivity, good quality and low production costs in producing consumer goods, we must pay special attention to training and cultivating the technical workers and cadres, so that they become people with high consciousness of socialism, high technical levels, and good vocational skills. That is also a major policy which must be strictly implemented in the process of guiding and organizing production management. With regard to the national defense industry factories and enterprises, before and during the process of shifting over to the production of consumer goods it is necessary to ensure that when the technical cadres and workers are assigned the production of a product they are given technical training. With regard to the technical cadres and workers of the national defense factories, enterprises, and production bases specializing in the production of consumer goods, it is most important that they be given continuous training, in order to increase their level of specialization in consumer goods technology.

The training programs, times, and methods should not be fixed, but carried out flexibly, in accordance with the characteristics and vocational level of each individual, on the specific circumstances of the material-technical bases, and on each place's instructional capability. We must especially stress guidance of the schools and training courses which train production team leaders and master workers to serve as the hard core of the technical workers and personnel.

Distribution, circulation, and management are important economic policies which directly affect the development of production, the increasing of labor productivity, and the improvement of workers' living conditions. On the basis of the policies promulgated by the state, the competent organs must immediately study and implement policies to encourage the factories, enterprises, and production bases to utilize their surplus capacity to produce consumer goods; salary and bonus policies to increase productivity, improve techniques, rationalize production; policies to provide hardship allowances and medical care for workers and servicemen engaged directly in production, etc.

Attention must be paid to scientific-technical research and to technical equipment. Under the present circumstances, we must make applied research the principal direction, in combination with basic research, and ensure that scientific-technical research adheres closely to the production line, while also entering deeply into resolving the difficulties in production and developing the latent capabilities of the national defense sector and enabling consumer goods production to undergo new developmental steps. If that is to be accomplished there must be effective plans, policies, and measures to rapidly apply the results of scientific-technical research to production, in order to create new domestic sources of raw materials; rationally and economically use raw materials and waste materials; improve products, produce more new products, and improve product quality; and provide new equipment and do a good job of utilizing the existing equipment capabilities, combining the primitive with the modern and mechanized labor with manual labor. In order to ensure that applied scientific-technical research achieves good results it is necessary to strengthen technical management, consolidate the scientific-technical research and management organs, create additional material-technical bases for research, and rationally utilize scientific-technical cadres, while also promoting the movement to develop initiatives to rationalize production and improve techniques.

That is a difficult, complicated task, but for many years now a number of factories and enterprises producing national defense goods have performed it well, so the quality of consumer goods they produce has clearly improved. In 1977, 20 percent of the aluminum pots produced by factory No 17 were Category II, but in 1978 only 8 to 10 percent were Category II. In 1977, 15 percent of the kerosene stoves were Category II, but in 1978 only 10 percent were Category II. In 1977, 1 percent of the enamelware were rejected, but in 1978 only .2 percent were rejected. In 1978, at the army's large wooden items enterprise 82.7 percent of the camp furniture was Category A and .3 percent was Category C, but during the first 6 months it surpassed the plan by 2 percent; 88 percent of the products were Category A and there were no Category C products. Factory Q165, which for the first time produced steel pipe-connecting sleeves. They met the technical standards, and were one-seventh as expensive as imported ones.

Developing the consumer goods industry is an extremely important and urgent economic task. Although there are limitations, the developmental capabilities are still very great. Under the light of the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the national defense sector is resolved to struggle to create a strong transformation, promote the production of consumer goods, meet the needs of life and exports, strengthen combat and combat-readiness capabilities, and contribute positively to the enterprise of defending the homeland and successfully building socialism.

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IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTION WORK STRESSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 80
pp 25-30, 38

[Article by Le Tat Thang: "The Inspection Work and the Art of Leadership and Command"]

[Text] Inspection is a very important aspect of leadership and command, and of the art of leadership and command.

"Without inspection there can be no leadership." (1) Leadership and command must do more than set forth policies and plans that must be implemented. As Uncle Ho admonished, "In order to lead it is necessary to carry out three tasks: Setting forth correct lines and policies, doing a good job of executing policies; and continually, promptly, and fully inspecting the execution of lines and policies." (2) Thus inspections combine with the other factors to form the all-round contents of leadership and command.

Due to the special characteristics of our army's missions, many activities of the troops, especially their combat readiness and combat activities, are related to the sacrifices of the soldiers and people, and to the enterprise of defending and building the homeland. Therefore, one of the very important requirements of the army's leadership and command before decisions -- especially combat decisions -- are made, is correct evaluation of the situation. Inspection is the best, most effective way to most correctly evaluate the situation. It may be said that inspection is the final, concluding step in the preparatory phase. If it is said that "Meticulous preparation amounts to half of what is required to win victory," the inspection work clearly plays a very great role. It not only stimulates the best fulfillment of the preparatory process and concludes the preparatory phase, but is a very important condition in opening the way to victory and ensuring certain victory.

By means of inspections the cadres in charge can review all of the organization and implementation measures they have taken and reevaluate the capabilities of the forces for which they are responsible, as well as the qualities and talents of the cadres and enlisted men in the unit. Only by means of inspections can we determine which measures are correct and promptly discover which measures are inappropriate and must be corrected immediately. Inspections also enable the leadership echelons

and command cadres to reexamine the policies they have adopted and the resolutions, instructions and orders that have been promulgated.

Stalin affirmed that "Leadership does not mean writing resolutions and issuing directives. Leadership means inspecting the execution directives, not only inspecting the execution of directives but also inspecting the directives themselves... in order to find out whether those directives are correct or incorrect." (3) Stalin also stressed that "We may say with certainty that 90 percent of our deficiencies and shortcomings result from failure to do a good job of inspecting the work that is done." (4)

With regard to the party building, inspections are not only an important factor in contributing to the construction of all-round strong party organizations but also constitute one of the basic contents of the party building work itself. Inspections serve to encourage and teach party members and cadres to fulfill their responsibilities toward the party and state, and to set a good example for the people. Therefore, they contribute to strengthening the party ideologically and organizationally.

Thus thanks to inspections leadership and command may quickly determine what is correct and good, promptly uncover what is incorrect and bad and, most important, stimulate the positive and progressive and restrict the negative and backward. And therefore inspections are an effective means, a very sharp tool of leadership and command. Furthermore, inspections very clearly manifest the qualities and abilities of leadership and command.

Inspections must concentrate on the most important problems and stimulate the fulfillment of the principal missions.

As is true with regard to many other tasks, the inspection work in our army must be comprehensive, and must review -- and contribute to furthering -- all activities of the unit and the party organization. But the effectiveness of the inspection work lies in knowing how to concentrate on the most basic, most essential problems, and in stimulating the troops to fulfill the most important, key missions of each unit in each period of time.

First of all, it is necessary to concentrate on inspecting the implementation of the lines, stands, and policies of the party. For example, after the party has clearly determined the new strategic objectives of our country's revolution and the new operational objectives of our army and people, the inspection work in the army must immediately enter deeply into those matters in order to examine, evaluate, analyze, and reach conclusions about the correct and incorrect con-

sciousness, viewpoints, and thoughts of our cadres and enlisted men. Only thereby can we promptly have policies, plans, and measures for continuing to cultivate and educate, so that the entire army can achieve unanimity, clearly distinguish between friend and foe, maintain vigilance, and be determined to victoriously fulfill their combat missions. Whenever the party sets forth one of the immediate urgent objectives of our army and people we must resolutely struggle to overcome the negative aspects in the economic and social activities, and the inspection work in the army must immediately oriented toward that task in order to ensure that our entire army carries it out strictly and absolutely, and enable each unit

to resolutely overcome the negative, backward phenomena and positively participate in the common struggle against negativism in society. Or, in order to develop the socialist collective mastership right the army's inspection work must protect and develop the collective mastership right of cadres, enlisted men, and the people, prevent all violations of their collective mastership right, and especially must resolutely and absolutely bring an end to bureaucratic and militaristic acts, violations of discipline regarding civilian proselytizing, etc.

In addition to inspecting the implementation of the party's lines and policies, the army's inspection work absolutely must concentrate on the execution of the mission of maintaining combat readiness and fighting to defend the fatherland. That is the most important political mission of our armed forces, both in the short range and the long range. Today, when our nation is facing a new, very dangerous enemy and our people are facing a peril which directly threatens the independence of the homeland, and at a time when our country is at peace but is threatened with the outbreak of war at any time, our entire army must continually maintain a high degree of combat readiness. With regard to the present mission of defending the homeland there are also very new, comprehensive, and complicated problems. The inspection work must make the most positive, sharpest implement used to victoriously carry out that important mission of the entire army.

In addition to inspecting the status of combat readiness it is necessary to continually inspect the building up and training of the army, in order to increase its combat strength. That is one of the army's central tasks during the period before war breaks out and also is one of the important measures for increasing its combat strength even in the course of fighting. That is also one of the objectives of the campaign to "develop the fine nature and increase the fighting strength" of the armed forces at the present time. Inspections of the fulfillment of the mission of increasing the army's combat strength must always be based on the party's basic guidelines regarding the building up of the army.

Today, when our army has undergone important development regarding weapons and technical equipment in the process of modernization, the inspection work must promptly and effectively serve that entire process. All of our weapons and equipment are the priceless property of the revolution, the effort and sacrifice of the people -- our people and those of the fraternal socialist countries -- and a very important element of combat strength and a very basic condition for ensuring victory for the great undertaking of defending our country in the immediate future and in the long range. Therefore, the inspection work must contribute effectively to ensuring complete supplying, tight management, careful maintenance, and utilization that is in correct accordance with capacities and functions, and preventing losses, damage, or down-rating. Inspections must also pay attention to quantity and quality, to what is being used and what is stockpiled, to the minimum conditions regarding storage and the systems and regulations regarding management and maintenance, etc.

At present, the execution of orders has become a very strict requirement for the entire army. The inspection work must contribute positively to bringing about a strong transformation in the execution of orders and to raising our army's professionalism to a new, higher level.

The inspection work must also develop its role in furthering the fulfillment of the production labor and economic construction mission, for that has always been a very important political mission of the army. In inspecting the fulfillment of the production labor mission it is necessary not only to examine the policies and implementation plans, but also to evaluate labor productivity and economic effectiveness. Especially, it is necessary to inspect the task of carrying out the production labor and combat readiness missions, and ensuring high productivity in production labor, while still maintaining a high degree of combat readiness.

Each unit must carry out its inspection work on the basis of its principal missions and tasks and its degree of concentration on them.

With regard to the party building work of the army's party organization, today the inspection work must concentrate on the very basic, very urgent requirements of contributing positively to improving the quality of the corps of party members, promoting party development, improving the leadership ability of the party chapters and party committees, increasing the command and management responsibilities of the various echelons, and building comprehensively strong and truly pure party base organizations.

The inspection work must contribute worthily to doing a truly good job of issuing party membership cards, for that is an important task with profound significance which directly serves the requirement of consolidating and building the party in many respects, educating the party members in order to increase their consciousness of the party, their spirit of revolutionary endeavor, and consciousness of organization, discipline, and internal unity, while also furthering the carrying out of the campaign to build a strong and pure party, improving the quality of party member management, and preventing the enemy and bad elements from sneaking into the party. In inspecting of the issuing of party cards, it is necessary first of all to do a truly good job of examining the qualifications of party members and reach conclusions as to whether each party member is qualified or unqualified to be a party member. That may be said to be one of the most important matters, one of decisive significance, in the task of issuing party membership cards. It must be based on the requirements regarding the qualifications of party members, such as those stipulated in the Party Statutes and in Directive 192 of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee regarding the improvement of party member quality and the expulsion of unqualified people from the party. The inspection work must enter deeply into problems which have the nature of being principles, and ensure the correct observance of principles, such as the principle of only issuing party membership cards to people who are fully qualified to be party members; the principle of investigating all party members and reaching conclusions regarding party member qualifications in the party chapters, and the principle that only the party chapters and party committees have the right to reach conclusions and make decisions regarding qualifications. Only thereby can the inspection work contribute as positively as possible to achieving good results in issuing party membership cards, contribute to improving the quality of party members, consolidate the base-level party organization, and facilitate the victorious fulfillment of all missions.

The inspection work must also enter deeply into enforcing discipline and disposing of discipline cases, in order to maintain strict party discipline, ensure unity of thought and action in the party, and ensure the party's purity of organization and

and combat strength. An extremely important mission of the task of inspecting party discipline in the army party organization is ensuring that the lines and policies of the party, the laws of the state, and the orders of the army are always observed fully and absolutely.

Knowing how to concentrate on the most basic problems when carrying out the inspection work in a concentrated, definitive way, and how to use the inspection work as a lever with which to further the fulfillment of the unit's principal missions, is a manifestation of the quality and skill of leadership and command.

Inspections are a direct responsibility of the leadership echelons and the command cadres.

Inspections are not the concern only of the inspection organs or the inspection cadres, but are above all a direct responsibility and a permanent task of leadership and command. Therefore, the objective of inspections is to stimulate the victorious fulfillment of all missions of the unit and the building of strong party organizations and units. Thus inspections are always tied in with leadership and command and are a very effective leadership and command method of the party committees and the cadres in charge. Most of the contents of the inspection work are very important matters which are relevant to stands and policies, or are matters of principle or regulations concerning which only the party committees or the cadres in charge are authorized to reach conclusions and make decisions. Other requirements of the inspection work are to clearly distinguish between the correct and the incorrect, clearly determine the good points and the deficiencies, and promptly adopt correct policies to develop the strengths and overcome the weaknesses. Therefore, only the party committees or the cadres in charge are qualified and authorized to make final decisions. As we have often observed, the objects of inspection are not only individuals but also collectives, not only party members but also party committees, and not only enlisted men but also cadres, including middle-level and high-level cadres. Therefore, only if the party committees or the cadres in charge give direct guidance can the inspection work be strong and achieve results.

However, not every inspection must be carried out directly by the party committees and the cadres in charge. The important matter is that the party committees and the cadres in charge must know how to examine and analyze the nature and requirements of each matter that must be investigated in order to adopt correct policies, correctly utilize forces, know how to mobilize the forces that are essential and can be mobilized, and determine correct missions, distinguishing between the ones they can inspect directly and those that must be carried out by the inspection forces, under their direction and in accordance with the positions and authority of each person and organization. There are some things which must be inspected directly by the party committees, such as inspecting the execution of party lines and policies, inspecting the fulfillment of missions and tasks within the leadership responsibility of the party organizations which were assigned by the upper echelons, were set forth by party organization congresses at the relevant echelons, or advocated by the party committees themselves. There are some tasks which are directly carried out by the inspection organs, such as inspections of the observance of Party Statutes, party discipline, state laws, or military discipline, or the fulfillment of other tasks assigned by the party committees and the cadres in charge. But no matter what is being inspected, no matter where or by what forces,

It is necessary for the party committees and the cadres in charge to adopt policies, draft detailed plans, and have tight organization. It may be affirmed that with regard to the inspection work, in all instances the questions of whether or not strength is developed and whether or not there is good quality and effectiveness depend largely on the levels and capabilities of the party committees and the cadres in charge of units.

The effect of inspections is manifested not only in the inspections and in the inspection teams, but also in knowing how to combine the inspection method with the leadership and command methods. Therefore, every problem and event that must be inspected, as well as the good points and deficiencies, are usually caused by many factors, not by any one factor, and those factors are usually related to many components. Furthermore, the task of developing or overcoming them must pass through many phases. The causative factors may be related to knowledge, viewpoints, or thoughts; some are concerned with levels and ability; some are caused by a lack of material conditions; and some are even caused by incorrect, inappropriate policies. Each factor may be resolved by a certain measure, or sometimes by many measures. Therefore, in order to affirm and develop the good points and overcome the deficiencies it is necessary to overcome the deficiencies. The most important matter is that we must uncover, and reach correct conclusions about, the good points and deficiencies, but it is even more important that we know how to apply many measures and resolve many problems in many different phases, and know how to combine those measures with one another in order to develop the good points and overcome the deficiencies urgently and definitively. For example, when inspecting the status of combat readiness we must of course inspect both combat morale and combat skills, both the level of combat readiness and fighting strength, and both combat facilities and facilities for supporting combat. But the decisive matter is that by means of inspections it is necessary to discover which elements are weakest in order mobilize the necessary forces and apply the necessary measures to develop the correct aspects and promptly overcome the aspects which are still weak and deficient.

Clearly, inspection must be closely tied in with the other aspects of leadership and command. Therefore, the inspection method must be combined with the other leadership and command measures. If that is to be achieved, the party committees and cadres in charge must always know how to closely combine the inspection work with all other work, so that to have a work plan is to have an inspection plan. And once there is an inspection plan there must be a plan to exploit the results of the inspection. They must also know how to combine regular inspections with ad hoc inspections during key periods, and know how to combine all-round inspections with inspections of each aspect, with regard to the key problems, the weakest and most difficult aspects, and the most important objectives.

Ultimately, the results and effectiveness of inspection are dependent on the qualities and ability of the inspectors. By "inspectors" we do not mean only the inspection cadres but also the party committees, and party members, the cadres and organs, and the enlisted men and personnel who participate directly in the inspection work. Since the most essential aspect of control is promptly distinguishing between the correct and the incorrect and the good and the bad, and pointing out the strong points that must be developed and the weak points that must be overcome. Therefore, people and forces carry out inspections must meet certain standards regarding moral character and ability. Comrade Le Duan, Secretary General of the

Party, said of inspection that "Only with knowledge can we distinguish between the correct and the incorrect, and only if we are pure can we truly be objective and not partial." He also stressed that "Only if the mirror is bright will the reflection be strong." (5) Therefore, people who carry out inspections must first be "Inspected," and must inspect themselves with regard to their moral character and ability.

FOOTNOTE

- (1) Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the Fourth Party Congress.
- (2) President Ho's Instructions at the First All-North Inspection Conference, 19 April 1955.
- (3) Stalin, "Complete Works," Vol. 11, Su That Publishing House, p.68.
- (4) Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," p.725.
- (5) Le Duan, "Some Problems of the Party's Inspection Work," p.19.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ARMORED CORPS TECHNICAL PERSONNEL URGED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 80 pp 39-46

[Article by Senior Colonel Trinh Hoang Dinh: "Building Up the Corps of Technical Troops and Personnel of the Armored Combat Arm"]

[Text] That is an important and urgent task of the combat arm which is intended to rapidly improve its ability to use, repair, maintain, manage, and master weapons and equipment; limit the breaking down, loss, and damage of equipment and weapons; and ensure combat-readiness and victorious combat. In the long run, it is one of the foremost tasks in building up the combat arm technically and enabling people to master technology, in order to enable the combat arm to attain an increasingly higher degree of professionalism and modernity, so that it can be worthy of being, along with the infantry, the principal assault force on the battlefield.

Recently, due to the combat requirements and the continual renewal of equipment and weapons, as well as the rapid increase in the organizational system and the bases providing material-technical support for the combat arm's development and combat, the corps of technical troops and personnel have undergone new development. The units, schools, supply depots, stations, and workshops of the combat arm, the tank and armored vehicle units, and the repair workshops are using and training a large force of technical troops and personnel consisting of all components, and meeting the needs of the strong development of the combat arm, while also paying attention to upgrading and improving the vocational skills of the older comrades and enabling the technical troops and personnel to undergo new development quantitatively and qualitatively.

The technical troops and personnel of the combat arms include many different components. Some components specialize in utilization, while others specialize in the repair, management, or maintenance of equipment and weapons. Each component has a different position, role, and mission, and has its own important nature. But all three components directly use, repair, maintain, and store the weapons and technical equipment of the combat arm. The questions of whether storage is good, whether weapons and equipment are durable, and whether they prove effective in combat are determined principally by the corps of technical troops and personnel. Those three components are closely interrelated and affect one another in a complete

system: only if there is good storage can there be good utilization, only if there is good utilization will there be less damage and will less time be spent making repairs, and only if good repairs are made can there be good utilization. The corps of technical troops and personnel is also a rich source of supplementation for the corps of technical cadres. Therefore, the combat arm regards the training, cultivation, and development of the corps of technical troops and personnel as an extremely important part of the development of the combat arm in general and its technical development in particular. It is not only an urgent task in the rapid creation of a corps of military technical personnel to meet the immediate requirements of combat and development, but is also an important task in the long-range development of the combat arm. That task will serve to enable the troops to master certain trades, so that after they have fulfilled their military obligations they can serve the national economic sectors and contribute to the construction of socialism.

Building up the combat arm's corps of technical troops and personnel is not an entirely new subject. During the years of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, and especially since we began preparations to oppose the Chinese army, the combat arm, due to the requirements of the combat and development missions, has advanced the development of the corps of technical troops and personnel to a new level. By means of study in schools and concentrated courses, and by on-the-job training in the units, stations, workshops, enterprises, and factories, has been able to train thousands of military technical personnel in the use, repair, management, and maintenance of equipment and weapons. However, the quantity and quality of training has not yet corresponded to the increasingly great renovation of the material-technical bases, or met the increasingly great requirements of the combat arm's combat and development missions.

The various echelons throughout the combat arm are endeavoring to overcome difficulties in order to enable the training of technical troops and personnel to occupy an important position in the combat arm's over-all training and development in accordance with a unified and professional program. That is a task with many difficulties and complications which must undergo a strong transformation with regard to consciousness, and at the same time there must be correct and practical directions and measures for organizing implementation.

It is necessary to fully understand the missions of the army and the combat requirements and missions of the combat arm, and on that basis build a corps of technical troops and personnel which has sufficient numbers, high quality, and balance, and which represents all the sectors and trades. We must correctly resolve the relationships between quality and quantity, and between development and consolidation.

The matter of the quality of the corps of technical troops and personnel is based on the position, role, and combat missions of the combat arm in war to defend the homeland. The armored troops and the infantry constitute the army's principal assault force. In combat the armored troops supported by the infantry and other combat arms, can play the principal assault role in campaigns and battles. They are being developed into a strong combat arm along the lines of professionalization and modernization so that they can, along with the people's armed forces, fulfill the key missions in combat readiness and combat to defend the homeland. The responsibilities of the combat arm in consolidating national defense, in building a professional and modern revolutionary people's army, and in fighting to defend

the socialist homeland are very great and difficult. In order to do a good job of fulfilling those responsibilities, the combat arm must be strong under all circumstances of war, and must develop to a high degree its assault force, firepower, and mobility, in order to win victory in the very first battles and on the battlefields assigned to it. A combat arm is strong because of many combined factors, including a strong fighting spirit, good organization of command and leadership, a rational and complete organizational structure, good tactical and technical ability, and material-technical bases, equipment, and weapons that are modern, appropriate, and continually improving. There must also be a corps of technical troops and personnel that is numerically sufficient and of good quality. A corps of high-quality technical troops and personnel is one of the permanent factors which determine the quality of the task of supporting the combat arm technically, with regard to use, repair, management, and maintenance of equipment and weapons in training as well as in combat-readiness and combat.

The technical troops and personnel of the armored combat arm must first of all be people who are fully qualified politically and have good revolutionary morals. It must be ensured that when tanks, armored vehicles, and modern technical equipment and facilities are delivered the people using them are reliable. That standard must receive attention, from the selection of personnel throughout the process of training, utilization, upgrading, and promoting. We must be determined to prevent people who do not fully meet political standards and who are deficient with regard to virtue to serve as military technical personnel. On the basis of selecting people who fully meet the political-ideological, educational, and physical standards, we must emphasize training and cultivation to comprehensively improve the quality of the technical personnel, including revolutionary virtue, professional ability, consciousness, and the capability to master modern weapons and equipment.

With regard to politics and ideology, they must love the trades and work assigned them, be prepared to accept missions in all units and places, have a strong fighting will, not fear sacrifice or hardship, have a brave and urgent workstyle in combat, be diligent, meticulous, and accurate in using, repairing, and maintaining weapons and equipment, have strong consciousness of organization and discipline, and have a civilized, wholesome way of life.

With regard to ability, they must have the stipulated educational level and continually strive to fulfill the missions and trades that are assigned, while also studying to improve their scientific-technical knowledge. The technical troops and personnel specializing in operation, such as tank and armored vehicle drivers, tank commanders, gunners, communications, military engineers, etc., in addition to studying to raise their technical and vocational levels, so that they can fulfill their responsibilities, they must study related scientific-technical subjects. The comrades doing repair work must, in addition to studying to master their trades, study technical combat operations, detachment tactics, and general scientific-technical subjects directly relevant to their trades, such as machinery manufacture, welding, plumbing, blacksmithing, electricity, etc. The comrades engaged in the management, maintenance, and storage of weapons and equipment must study in order to know the capacities and use of each type, and know good storage and maintenance methods and how to counter humidity, rust, mildew, and fires. They must also study foreign languages so that they can be capable of assimilating the scientific-technical knowledge of other countries.

With regard to health, they must toughen themselves so that they can meet the requirements of training and labor, work urgently, and endure tense, continuous combat.

With regard to orders, they must study in order to carry out the orders of the army, and all orders, regulations, and stipulations regarding the technical work.

Before beginning to use equipment and facilities, all technical troops and personnel must undergo a period of basic training, in observance of the principle that equipment should be provided only after the people have been trained and equipment should only be issued to people who can use it expertly. That training period must be based on the requirements of each component, and on whether it is given during wartime or peacetime.

The tank and armored car drivers, and the various kinds of repairmen, must study for the necessary period of time. In training, we must firmly grasp the slogan of basic, systematic, all-round, and unified training. When new technical troops and personnel are assigned to the units, the various echelons must have plans to have the old people supervise the new people, and also have plans to ensure that they continually improve, in both theory and practice. At regular intervals we must provide supplementary training in order to upgrade tradesmen, drivers, and gunners in according with unified training objectives and programs.

Ensuring a sufficient number of technical troops and personnel is a pressing need at the present time, and is also a permanent requirement to maintain and develop the corps of technical troops and personnel, so that it can be complete, solid, balanced, and uniform. Only if there exists the necessary number of technical troops and personnel can there be a basis for creating a corps of technical troops and personnel that is strong qualitatively. The quantity of technical troops and personnel is important not only because of the requirement of troop replacement in peacetime and the supplementation of technical forces in wartime, but also because of the collective, coordinated, and cooperative nature of combat organization and the various kinds of crew weapons, and the increasingly modern nature of the combat arm. In order to always have sufficient numbers of technical troops and personnel, so that no matter what the circumstances they can promptly meet the requirements of maintaining combat readiness and fighting victoriously, as well as fulfilling the mission of continuous development and training. We must know how to take the initiative in providing those numbers, from many sources, in many forms, and with many positive measures.

Clearly realizing the importance of quantity in the process of building up the corps of technical troops and personnel, during the past several years the combat arm has overcome all difficulties in order to set up additional professional training schools and classes, which have trained thousands of technical troops and personnel to supplement the units and form new units. Some classes have been held in schools for technical officers and personnel, some classes have been organized by brigades and regiments, and some classes have been held at the repair stations and workshops. Some classes and campaigns have been organized by the combat arm, but many have been organized by the tank-armored vehicle units in the corps and military regions, with the combat arm providing assistance with regard to the curricula and materials. During periods of strong development with regard to the organization of combat forces and weapons and equipment, in order to meet the

requirements of combat-readiness and large-scale combat within very brief periods of time, the combat arm has asked the upper echelon to provide it with technical troops and personnel from the other combat arms who have technical skills required by the armored forces, such as tracked vehicle and bulldozer drivers, tractor drivers, amphibious vehicle drivers, truck drivers, motor mechanics, etc., so that they could rapidly become technical personnel of the armored combat arm by attending short-term supplementary training and retraining courses. In addition to training new classes it is necessary to educate, cultivate, use, and retain experienced cadres to serve as the hard core. But it is first of all necessary to firmly grasp the situation, have tight organization and plans during troop recruitment campaigns, and ensure that there are people to replace them, and when people are promoted to the ranks of cadres they must be replaced and we should leave open no positions that affect combat readiness. Therefore, although the sources for supplementing the army's economic-technical branches are limited, the combat arm must continually develop, and at times must undergo unplanned development but still supply sufficient numbers of technical troops and personnel.

Since the combat arm is now concentrating on promoting the process of modernization with regard to equipment and weapons, and is developing strongly with regard to the organization of combat forces, the role of the combat arm in coordinated arms combat by the armed forces branches and combat arms in war to defend the homeland has become very important, so the numerical requirement for technical troops and personnel cannot be restricted, as if the combat arm were still in the liberation war period.

Furthermore, the combat arm, as well as the entire army, has many capabilities to increase the rate at which the combat arm undergoes new development. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the corps of technical personnel even more. But the numerical expansion of the military technical personnel must be based on the immediate technical support requirements and depend on plans to develop the organization, equipment, and weapons of the combat arm. There must be training plans of a scientific nature that are based on an overall plan which takes into consideration both quantity and quality. We should not, merely because of the requirement of having sufficient technical personnel, increase their numbers hastily and arbitrarily, in an unscientific manner, or lower the recruitment and training standards and conditions. For it is not necessarily true that if there are many technical personnel technical support will be good; if there are large numbers but the necessary quality standards are not met, then the larger the numbers the weaker we will be -- the technical workers and the technical support work will not be strengthened, but may be weakened. Therefore, although the matter of the quantity of technical troops and personnel has become an urgent requirement, and although we must add a large number of technical troops and personnel in a very brief period of time, we still must pay much attention to correctly resolving the relationships between quantity and quality and between development and consolidation, so that in all situations we can maintain the all-round strength of the corps of technical personnel.

After training in schools and concentrated courses, we must pay all-out attention to improving skills on the job.

During the past several years, in addition to strictly carrying out the basic professional training program the combat arm has established additional methods of

supplementing the corps of technical troops and personnel, in accordance with the immediate requirements, and has overcome the weaknesses and deficiencies of each category and each individual. That is an indispensable task after the basic training program has been completed, and is intended to ensure that the corps of technical troops and personnel is capable of giving technical support in the coordinated combat of the combat arm as well as in coordination between the armored combat arm and the other armed forces branches and combat arms. In addition to advanced technical and vocational training, the combat arm has also paid attention to drafting and implementing regulations and rules regarding the use, management, maintenance and repair of weapons and equipment, to serve as a legal basis on which the military technical troops and personnel can fulfill their responsibilities. Therefore, although it must continue to be supplemented in many regards, essentially the combat arm's corps of technical personnel is capable of playing the role of the hard-core force in directly using, maintaining, and repairing vehicles, guns, and equipment in order to serve the combat arm's development, training, combat-readiness, and combat missions.

With regard to technical and vocational supplementation, the technical sector and the units throughout the combat arm have, on the basis of evaluating the weaknesses and deficiencies of each category and each technician, drafted supplementation plans and contents that are appropriate for each category. The technical troops and personnel using the equipment and weapons in tanks and armored vehicles have continually taken advanced training in order to achieve expertise in driving vehicles, firing weapons, using radios, etc., at the various technical levels. The technical troops and personnel engaged principally in repair work receive advanced technical training so that everyone can firmly grasp the technical capabilities of the combat arm's existing equipment and weapons and be skilled in repairing vehicles, guns, etc. The technical troops and personnel specializing in maintenance and management not only receive technical training but are trained with regard to the regulations, rules, and statutes regarding the maintenance and management of equipment and weapons. In addition to basic professional training and continual, yearly supplemental training, the combat arm has also organized step-increase examinations and raised levels, after everyone has received concentrated supplementary training and reviews with regard to both theory and practice.

In order to ensure that the training and supplementation of technical troops and personnel attain high quality, the combat arm has implemented the slogan of all-round, balanced, complete training, in many forms and with many practical methods, for all categories and groups of personnel, old and new. We must do a good job of implementing the training method of advancing from theoretical knowledge to the expert use on the part of all types of technical troops and personnel. Everyone, depending on his functions and occupations, must have the ability to accurately and competently handle the basic technical and professional problems, to create a solid basis on which everyone can gradually meet the requirement of flexible and creative application in practice. The goal of technical support is the defeat of the enemy, so it is essential that we also pay attention to tactical training, especially for the troops and personnel who directly use the equipment.

In tactical training we cannot pay attention only to tactical aspects and use the results of tactics to evaluate coordination capabilities, but must also stress enabling everyone to be conscious of coordinating even when studying technical matters and the functions of the tank and armored vehicle crew members. That is a

principal content which is regarded as the focal point of all training courses and supplementation of technical troops and personnel. At the same time, it is necessary to pay all-out attention to the techniques of using, maintaining, and repairing radios in order to ensure uninterrupted communications under all circumstances. In order to achieve good coordination, it is necessary to, on the basis of the skills of each person, develop all abilities of all crew members, in order to create combined strength for each vehicle and unit. Therefore, in addition to training so that all crew members can master their techniques, skills, functions, and tasks, the combat arm has also closely guided the implementation of the training slogan, "skilled in one's job and able to do the jobs of the other crewmen," in order to coordinate in combat, assist one another, and replace one another when necessary.

In addition to improving the contents and curricula, the combat arm has also paid special attention to the training methods. There must be improvement in both technical training and the tactical subjects, along the lines of scientific training methods. Theoretical training must be accompanied by practice, with practice receiving the principal emphasis, and we must overcome the old-style patchwork, arbitrary, vague theoretical training which pays scant attention to practice. In technical and vocational training, in each class and study cycle the cadres and instructors must create conditions for the students, drivers, gunners, and mechanics to train under difficult, complicated circumstances that are similar to those of actual combat, so that all elements participating in training can apply what they have learned in practice. The troops and personnel specializing in utilization must do a good job of using equipment and weapons, and maneuver and retrieve vehicles on complicated terrain. Those specializing in repair and maintenance must be expert in using vehicles and weapons in the field, and know how to overcome difficulties and solve technical and materiel problems in order to ensure that the units fulfill their combat and training missions.

In order to do a good job of guiding technical and vocational training and supplementation, and showing concern for the material well-being of the troops, the combat arm has paid attention to and has done a good job of carrying out, political education, and has created consciousness of organization, discipline, and good work styles. No matter what missions they are fulfilling, everyone must have a spirit of loving their trades, respecting their vehicles and weapons, and always care for, maintain, and use over a long period of time, the equipment and weapons assigned by the leadership echelon for their use, repair, management, or maintenance. No matter what the circumstances, in training and combat both the old and the new technical troops must strictly enforce the technical regulations, rules, and statutes, and fulfill the technical support missions that are assigned.

All technical personnel categories and individuals must, after being trained, be used in the trade they studied. People who are not used in their specialties should receive further training so that they can have the technical and vocational skills to fulfill the missions assigned. Correct utilization is manifested not only in rational assignments, but also in upgrading and promoting in correct accordance with the standards, regulations, and policies. Every year the combat arm organizes supplementary training to upgrade the technical personnel, and drafts plans to recruit fully qualified people to become technical cadres. Only thereby can the combat arm develop all capabilities of the corps of technical troops and personnel, and meet its increasingly greater development requirements.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF READY RESERVES STRESSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 7, Jul 80 pp 60-65

[Article by Colonel Thong Son: "Building, Training, and Managing Ready Reserve Forces"]

[Text] Building ready reserve forces is a great strategic task which both responds to the urgent immediate situation and is appropriate to the long-range requirements of developing and defending the homeland.

Based on our experiences in defeating the U.S. in the past and our recent defeat of the Chinese aggressor army, to ensure the fulfillment of both missions -- defending the homeland and successfully building socialism -- our state has adopted the policy of developing ready reserve forces, in order to prepare for our army a powerful reserve force that is prepared to cope with all war circumstances and is sufficiently strong to defeat the enemy.

To fulfill military obligations in the form of reserve mobilization is to prepare for the regular army a strong reserve force, develop along professional, modern lines, and meet the requirement of coordinated combat by armed forces branches and combat arms on the various scales of war.

If we are to carry out the viewpoint of combining the economy with national defense and national defense with the economy, our army must build both strong standing forces and strong reserve forces, in order to both prepare for war and create for the nation an army with strong political consciousness, consciousness of strict organization and discipline, and advanced cultural, scientific, and technical knowledge, in order to strongly defend and successfully build the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The ready reserve forces are to be drawn from all young men capable of fulfilling immediate combat missions and of developing until they can meet the requirements of modern people's war to defend the homeland in the long range. But the largest and principal force is still the youths who are employed by the state or are in relatively concentrated collective organizations which are easily managed and can

be rapidly mobilized, such as students in level-II general education schools, middle-level vocational schools, or colleges, and the cadres, workers, and personnel of state organs and enterprises.

The ready reserve forces must be developed along professional, uniform lines, to provide large supplementary forces for a professional, modern army. Therefore, the recruitment standards must be as strict as those for recruitment by the regular army. If there are no strict standards, or if recruitment is not carefully organized, then deficient people or bad elements may slip through and weaken the armed forces, or there will be sufficient numbers during the training phase but when it is necessary to mobilize and use the reserve forces there will not be enough people, which will cause great waste for the state and the collectives.

The training period of the ready reserve forces depends on the unified stipulations of the state, and is sufficient to ensure annual training in accordance with the (shortened) program for training new troops and with the necessary training regarding the armored combat arm. After the second cycle of concentrated training, the college students with two or more years of college and the cadres and workers of the organs and enterprises must take training that is suitable to their vocations and to the requirement of training officers for the branches and combat arms of a modern army.

The development and training of ready reserve forces must always be unified with the policy of building up the corps of state cadres, workers, and personnel. The results of annual training must be to consolidate the results of previous training and continually meet the new needs and standards. With regard to such technical combat arms as artillery, combat engineers, communications, reconnaissance, etc., only if there is training in many phases and continual consolidating can quality be assured. The direction for training ready reserve forces, in addition to the requirements regarding tactics, military technical subjects, and orders, includes always making the requirement of creating new socialist people and succeeding generations one of the objectives of training people who have the abilities and moral qualities of warriors who defend the homeland and are good citizens of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After a period of concentrated training, the organizational structure of the ready reserve forces must be continually consolidated in each base, to ensure that in ordinary times they serve as the nuclei of the mass armed forces and when war breaks out they can be rapidly mobilized into the army and fight immediately. The reserve forces must also be assigned more or less permanently to the reserve forces and be assigned clear leadership and command responsibilities. There must be plans for periodic training and maneuvers with the reserve troops, for only then can they fulfill their missions in the future.

The development of the ready reserves is a mission of the entire party, the entire population, and the entire army. The managing organs and the military units are principally responsible for organizing, developing, training, and managing.

The army's reserve forces include cadres, workers, and personnel who are employed by state organs and enterprises or who are permanently assigned to the schools and relatively concentrated bases in the localities. Therefore, development, training,

and management are responsibilities of all echelons, sectors, and local bases, not merely the responsibility of the military organs which have been assigned organization, development, and training tasks.

The building and training of ready reserve forces along professional, modern lines and on a large scale is a very meticulous, persistent, long-range task. Furthermore, the concentrated training periods of the army units are very brief, so the training results during those periods can only be the preconditions for future steps. If the concentrated training periods are not closely combined with continual consolidation and review at the local level, in accordance with a strict system, the results of the concentrated building and training period cannot be developed. In fact, if organization and training are difficult, the molding and management of people are even more difficult, especially with regard to the ready reserve forces, which are continually changing. We must bring people into organization and by means of organization and the study and activity systems consolidate the strength of the organization and develop and mold people. Only if very great efforts are made can those tasks be accomplished. The ready reserve cadres and enlisted men themselves often believe that completing concentrated training means that they have escaped from the compulsions of army discipline. But if the bases and localities only pay attention to production and other work, and do not supervise and admonish, or create conditions for the men to review, and especially if they do not resolutely maintain a military way of life the ready reserve forces will gradually decline with regard to quantity and quality, and when there is a mobilization the army will encounter difficulties.

The military units assigned training missions for a few months cannot do everything required to improve and maintain the quality of the reserve forces. At best, they can only build a foundation. Therefore, the principal, permanent responsibility for training belongs to the local military organs and to the organs, enterprises, and schools which directly manage that force.

The ready reserve forces are built up and trained along professional lines. After returning from undergoing concentrated training, they must participate in maintaining social order and security, and are responsible for joining the other forces in defending the negative phenomena in economic and social management. Those forces must always be prepared to fight and to work with the local armed forces in smashing all counterrevolutionary activities and preventing disturbances by bad elements in the localities. Clearly, the bases and localities must maintain tight leadership and command of those forces. That will also help prevent negative phenomena from arising among the ready reserve cadres and enlisted men caused by bad influence of negative phenomena in their families and in society. The tight management of those forces has an important significance in consolidating the organizations, building the new man, and promoting all aspects of work and production at the base level. If we continually do a good job of building and training, from one cycle to another, and exercise tight management, the bases and localities will always have strong armed forces which not only maintain a high degree of combat readiness but also help repulse the negative phenomena in society.

In order to build up the ready reserves, the state must adopt a number of specific policies to create favorable conditions so that the men can study contentedly and fulfill their missions. The goal of building ready reserve forces is to serve the

requirements of national defense and large-scale combat, so it is essential that we steel the cadres and men by means of the army's orders, regulations, and rules. But the ready reserve cadres and men have dual roles: they become regular troops in wartime and in peacetime, after undergoing concentrated training, return to their organs, enterprises, or schools to work, produce, and study as usual. If, at present, we do not certain forms to combine organizations, laws, and policies in management, it will be difficult to maintain continual combat strength. Furthermore, it is necessary to pay attention to the rear area and to their families, especially when they are undertaking concentrated training. There must be explicit regulations and policies to stimulate the positive aspects and limit and overcome the negative aspects, while encouraging the men to do a good job of building up the army and defending the homeland.

Since our country is still poor, it cannot meet all of the requirements that are set, so the responsible organs must study and resolve the immediate problems, in a manner appropriate to the specific capabilities and conditions of the localities, and they should not wait for the state to resolve them.

Paying attention to developing good people and continually building strong organizations, combined with the necessary policies, will encourage youths to fulfill their military obligations in that form.

We must study the formation of training teams for the ready reserves, and select skilled cadres and specialized technical personnel for those teams.

The ready reserve forces have two clear functions: training during ordinary times and fighting during wartime.

To achieve good development and training, first of all there must be a corps of skilled cadres, and at the same time there must be a force of skilled technical cadres. Since the reserve forces include many components and categories, and train in accordance with many programs and at many different times, many complicated problems must be resolved. Furthermore, those teams are not merely training teams but are also combat command and leadership organizations organized in that form. The requirement during the training period, should war break out, is to immediately change over to combat readiness and combat. Therefore, the ready reserve teams must be complete and relatively strong, not only in order to achieve high quality and good results in training but also to ensure combat-readiness and victorious combat under all circumstances. A corps of experienced leadership and command cadres and a professional, expert technical force are very important conditions for ensuring that the training bases fulfill their missions.

If organization is not strong and stable, the quality of unit development and training will not be high and bad thoughts may easily arise. In the process of building and training ready reserve forces, the regular and reserve cadres and men live together, and after a brief period of time are separated and live separately. Therefore, unanimity with regard to thoughts, sentiments, work styles, and many other matters, cannot be achieved immediately, so that everyone can go all-out to build a strong unit. With regard to that matter, the responsibility of the cadre teams is very great. Those comrades must take the initiative in positively building, consolidating, and developing the relationships between ready reserve cadres

and men and regular cadres and men, in order to unify the unit into a single bloc and achieve a high degree of unanimity regarding objectives and missions, in order to achieve good training and combat-readiness.

The cadres in those teams must clearly understand the special characteristics of the various categories and missions, so that they can take the initiative in all situations.

Ready reserve training covers many subjects in a brief period of time. Furthermore, the ready reserve cadres and men often have the attitude that they are on temporary duty, are reluctant to study urgently, are reluctant to accept discipline and undergo hardships. A rather large number of them, especially workers and officials who receive salaries and are accustomed to a free, comfortable way of life at home or in the organs and enterprises, and some who still work after regular hours, easily become discontented, do not thoroughly understand their missions, and fear being far from home, enduring hardships, and leading continually disrupted lives. That affects solidarity, unanimity, and confidence in one another, and the results and quality of work, study, and training. We must confirm responsibilities from the beginning, so that the cadres and men in the training teams can have correct viewpoints and thoughts, have a strong sense of political responsibility, have good methods and styles, and truly take the initiative in all regards, in order to create solidarity throughout the unit and do a good job of fulfilling the missions that are assigned.

Recently the actual experiences of the ready reserve training units of the Capital Military Zone have demonstrated that youths living under our regime -- especially the youths in Hanoi -- have relatively good moral and material conditions, have broad academic knowledge and understanding, and have a way of life that is different from that in many places, so there are requirements which cannot be met because the army is undergoing a vast expansion. Some youths who do not clearly understand their obligations easily become negative. If they don't clearly understand the characteristics of the various categories and the nature of the missions, cadres may have incorrect attitudes. Furthermore, we must enable the cadres, workers, and officials, as well as the high school and college students in the capital, to clearly realize their roles, honor, and responsibility, so that they can exert themselves, train well, be prepared to enter the army and fight to defend the homeland, and be worthy of their heroic country and its heroic capital.

The mission of building, training, and managing the ready reserves demands that the ideological work be very active, positive, effective, and sharp. We must pay attention to developing the good aspects, but must resolutely struggle against distortions. Organization must be very tight, strict, and specific. First of all, we must do a good job of educating and developing the corps of cadres, resolutely organize everyone, regulate all activities of the units in accordance with orders, and continually tie in the ideological work with the organization work to create a solid base of support on which to further all aspects of the work.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DECISION ON REASSIGNED, DEMOBILIZED MILITARY PERSONNEL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Oct 80 p 4

[Article: "Supplementing Policy on Reassigned and Demobilized Military Personnel"]

[Text] To create favorable conditions for military personnel, after having fulfilled their task and moved out of the army, to further develop the fine nature of the revolutionary soldiers, on 1 September 1980 the Council of Ministers issued Decision No 281/CP, which consists of the following articles:

Article 1 - The following military personnel who may not have served in the army for full 5 years, as they are transferred out of the army, are to get the same benefits after their reassignment or demobilization as those who have served for full 5 years in the army, as it is mentioned in items A and B in Decision No 178-CP of 20 July 1974 of the Council of Ministers:

- Female military personnel having served in the army for 3 consecutive years or more.
- Wounded military personnel having been classified as disabled.
- Military personnel having lost 31-59 percent of their working capacity because of combat or an international task in border areas and islands.

Article 2 - Military personnel having fulfilled their task in the army and having returned to their localities no longer than 6 months (from the date the army unit signed a decision to allow their demobilization or discharge from the army) who are recruited into a state organ or enterprise or are accepted through admission tests by concentrated training schools will benefit from the policy as military personnel being transferred straight from army units to organs, enterprises or schools and will stop receiving demobilization allowances (if any).

Article 3 - Point 2 in item C of Decision No 178-CP of 20 July 1974* is now abolished.

* Point 2, item C of Decision No 178-CP of 20 July 1974 states: "Noncommissioned officers and combatants operating on battlefields A, B and C who were wounded and classified as disabled, or operating on battlefields B and C who had a chronic disease, will receive the same benefits, although they may not have served in the army for 5 years, after their reassignment or demobilization as those who have served for more than 5 years in the army as mentioned in items A and B above" (footnote by NHAN DAN).

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CSO: 4209

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CORRUPTION IN, INAPPROPRIATE USE OF GASOLINE DEPLORED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7, 9 Oct 80

/Article by Hong Khanh and Thong Nong: "Where Does the Gasoline Go?"

/7 Oct 80, p 27

/Text Gasoline is the "grain" of industry. Each year, with the help of the fraternal countries, our country has had to reserve a large amount of money in order to import gasoline to support production and life. The cost of 1 ton of this fuel is, by the time it reaches the Port of Haiphong from abroad, almost equal to that of 1 ton of rice. And yet, gasoline inspection, management and use is very loose and this leads to much waste.

Inappropriate Allocations

The yearly gasoline allocation norms for each unit are based on the planned production and business enterprise tasks and the depreciation norms of the various types of machines, tools and materials. The allocation principle is to concentrate rationally on the urgent economic tasks and reduce distribution for nonproduction needs. But in reality, when formulating gasoline allocation norms, many units often make estimates; they take the amount used the previous year and then increase this by 20 to 30 percent. They greatly "expand" the budget figures so that things will be "perfect" after their budgets are "cut" by higher echelons. Such unscientific and deceitful ways of calculating things lead to a disruption of the distribution plans and, at times, they cause artificial tensions. In 1979, the Van Dien Dry Cell Battery Factory used only 27,263 kilograms of gasoline and 76,599 kilograms of diesel fuel but it formulated norms and was allocated 38,024 kilograms of gasoline, an increase of more than 30 percent, and 192,664 kilograms of diesel fuel, an increase of almost 150 percent. At the same time, the amount of lubricating oil used for machine and tool lubrication and maintenance was only 60 percent of the amount needed. The Viet Tri Power Plant requested 100 tons of diesel fuel but in reality it did

not need that type of fuel. A district in Ben Tre Province requested gasoline for tractors to plow 77,000 hectares but, in reality, the tractors were capable of plowing only one-half that area. During the 1979/1980 winter-spring production season, in plowing and irrigating the fields, Ninh Hai District in Thuan Hai Province used 600 liters of gasoline and 500 liters of diesel fuel to plant each hectare of onions and it used 700 liters of gasoline and 550 liters of diesel fuel to plant each hectare of garlic. But the district's export onion and garlic purchasing station formulated allocation norms of 900 liters of gasoline and 770 liters of diesel fuel for each hectare of onions and 1,000 liters of gasoline and 800 liters of diesel fuel for each hectare of garlic. The total amount of gasoline received in excess of the amount needed was 59,000 liters. The amount of products purchased fulfilled only 30 percent of the planned quotas.

The principle that has been put forth is that gasoline will be allocated only if there is equipment. But the Flour Mill Construction Board in Hanoi, for example, which does not have containers, vehicles, construction equipment, means of transportation and so on has still requested 50 tons of gasoline and 150 tons of diesel fuel. This unit has used gasoline allocation records and hired contracting units with construction equipment or let other units borrow them. The result is that the fuel distribution norms have been ruined. Since the contractors wanted work, they often set slightly "lower" hiring rates while those hiring the contractors found ways to increase the quotas. When what had been accomplished was calculated, /It was found that/ only 90,000 cubic meters of earth and rock had been leveled and emplaced and both sides filed reports doubling the statistics.

In Ho Chi Minh City, in 1980, the Building Service has transportation needs of 4.8 million ton-kilometers. The special-use means of transportation of the service can ensure the transportation of only 2.8 million ton-kilometers. To transport the remaining amount, means of transportation must be rented from the Communications and Transportation Service. But both have formulated gasoline allocation norms. Actually, the only thing necessary is to balance the amount of gasoline for fulfilling all the city's transportation tasks.

Since the units prepare budgets this way and the approving agencies do not inspect things, many times things are done to save face and things are divided in a "grasping" manner. In similar circumstances, one locality will be allocated too little and, after inspections are made, it will have to be supplied hundreds of additional tons while, at the same time, another locality will be allocated almost 50 percent more than it really needs.

Arbitrary Distribution

The management and distribution of gasoline has been entrusted to the General Gasoline and Oil Corporation subordinate to the Ministry of Supply. But this unit only receives it at the port, stores it and, based on the planned norms, distributes it to the ministries, localities and a number of large production installations. Almost 60 percent of the gasoline is supplied directly to the production installations by the ministries and localities. The General Gasoline and Oil Corporation regards its task completed when it has supplied the customer units with the approved amounts. How this gasoline is used after that and whether it is used in accord with the goals and objectives or not is not the direct responsibility of the General Corporation.

The director of a large construction corporation in Hanoi said, in reviewing the unit's work for the year, that "of the 220 'doors' that must be 'knocked' on in order to obtain materials, fuel, grain, capital and so on, the gasoline 'door' must be 'knocked' on the most, provided that there are allocation norms." Because there are no regulations that bind the supply agencies to the users, in many cases the gasoline is not used in accord with the objectives, goals and norms. One province has arbitrarily stipulated that each provincial party committee member will be supplied 200 liters of gasoline per month regardless of whether or not they have a compact car or motorcycle. This totalled 127,000 liters for the entire year, which is equal to approximately 5 percent of the gasoline used to satisfy the agricultural needs of that province. A number of lower echelon cadres also use gasoline in order to grant favors. In some places, the chairmen and village public security forces have ordered gasoline to be distributed. In 2½ months of the first quarter of 1980, the Ben Tre Materials Supply Corporation made 92 sales outside the plans, sales including 125,414 liters of gasoline. Personnel of the corporation's planning office have openly approved two gasoline sales to customers.

Directive No 124-TTg of 3 May 1972 stipulated that the various echelons cannot stockpile gasoline. Any unit that needs to stockpile gasoline must obtain the consent of the managing ministries, the Ministry of Supply and the General Gasoline and Oil Corporation and it can stockpile only 5 to 10 percent of the planned norm. But the flow of gasoline to the production and business enterprise points is often diverted or obstructed. When it reaches the provinces, the provinces keep some; when it reaches the districts, the districts keep some, and when it reaches the villages, even the villages keep some and so by the time it reaches the pumping and tractor stations and so on, little is left. During the last 6 months of last year, Haiphong City distributed gasoline to the leading sector units and to the subordinate units but it kept 44.4 percent of the gasoline and 26 percent of the diesel fuel allocated to these units. After these sectors and units received the gasoline and diesel fuel, they

in turn reserved some; for example, the Public Health Service distributed almost 90 percent of the gasoline and 70 percent of the diesel fuel to the primary installations, the Communications and Transportation Service distributed 63 percent of the gasoline and 83 percent of the diesel fuel allocated to the primary installations. As for the city of Hanoi, one year, because of reserving much, only on 20 November did it provide additional supplies to the primary installations and this created difficulties for the lower echelons in carrying out the planned tasks. Now, the rainy season is almost over but Y Yen District in Ha Nam Ninh Province has still not received 33 tons of diesel fuel, which is equal to 8 percent of the gasoline needs based on the 1980 allocation norms, the main reason being that, since the first quarter, the Provincial Tractor Branch has held back gasoline as "reserves."

A number of places have distributed gasoline by private letter using the words "warm greetings" instead of having a seal or documentary proof. Thus, when taking inventory at the beginning of 1980, the storehouse records of the Supply Corporation in a province showed 1,115 tons but, in reality, there were only 606 tons; more than 500 tons, or more than 10 percent of the gasoline needed to support agriculture in the province, were missing. In 1979, this corporation distributed gasoline free to cadres and workers for private use; this gasoline was valued at more than 52,000 dong. One responsible cadre in the corporation distributed 24 bills of sale following the "warm greetings" path; in this, some invoices for which no money was collected concerned 6,000 liters of diesel fuel. The amount of gasoline lost and wasted was several times the amount saved by the provincial marine products and agricultural sectors. In 1979, the Cao Lanh and Hong Ngu district supply stations in Dong Thap Province skimmed on the amount of gasoline in the planned norms and took this 637,000 liters of gasoline and 49,000 liters of diesel fuel and sold it on the outside.

/9 Oct 80, p 27

/Text7 Not In Accord With the Quotas

Gasoline evaporates easily, it is highly flammable and it changes volume depending on the temperature. It is a special type of material that cannot be stored with other types of goods. Because of this, it is easy to inspect and store. The state has set use quotas for the various types of vehicles, machines, tools and materials belonging to the different sectors. Some people say that it is difficult to fulfill these quotas. The reasons are: the plans for picking up materials and goods say one place but when the vehicles go to pick up the goods, they must go somewhere else to get them or return empty handed; the roads are full of chuckholes and many bridges are damaged; the vehicles and machines lack spare parts; the fields are uneven and muddy and so on. But this is correct to only a degree. There are many places with similar circumstances and the same difficulties

where the units have still managed to satisfactorily fulfill the quotas. The Dong Anh Agricultural Machine Station in Hanoi plowed a hectare using 1 kilogram less gasoline than stipulated by the quotas. Long An Province has regularly fulfilled the waste quotas for the tools used in plowing and loosening the soil and irrigating and draining the rice, peanuts and tobacco. Truck transport enterprises 6 and 18 and so on and many drivers such as Nguyen Van Ngu, Pham Quang Hung, Doan Phuc and others have, in using gasoline for 1,000 ton-kilometers, frequently used 10 to 15 kilograms of gasoline less as compared with the state quotas. They have been able to do this because of constantly improving their concept of mastery and clearly realizing that the quotas are the basis for implementing the economic accounting system and improving enterprise management. Thus, the units and individuals mentioned above have given attention to using gasoline in accord with the planned quotas and strengthening inspections and management and they have striven to apply the technical advances and satisfactorily coordinate the existing manual and mechanical measuring tools.

At the same time, many units and individuals have used gasoline very wastefully. They have gotten into a situation in which the quotas they have set are much higher than those set by the state and yet they have still failed to fulfill the quotas.

Disregarding state regulations, many people have arbitrarily established procedures for using compact cars and even enterprise and corporation directors have used compact cars to get to and from work each day. One construction corporation in southern Vietnam has 20 to 30 compact cars coming and going.

The use of gasoline in ways that are not in accord with the goals and objectives is rather widespread. People are in the habit of taking and they are not concerned about whether this gasoline brings economic results. Because of this, many units cannot inspect the gasoline consumption quotas for each task. The Bac Thai Gasoline Corporation inspected 15 customer units in 1979; very few places opened their monthly combined export-import and storehouse records. The import-export details could not be analyzed and only the cards of the storehouse custodians were used as a basis. The use of gasoline that is not in accord with the goals has led to a loss of balance in carrying out the plans. During the first 3 months of this year, in transporting goods, Nghia Binh Province fulfilled only 17 percent of the state plans; at the same time, it completely fulfilled the passenger transport plans (most of the passengers were merchants). Cai Be transport unit 3, which is subordinate to the Tien Giang Provincial Transport Corporation, transported only one-half the amount of state goods as private goods.

In the transport plans, the places have all made plans to use rudimentary means of transportation on the short routes. But when they have gasoline and there are means of transportation, many

places use these means of transportation in unplanned ways. Many agricultural cooperatives have used the gasoline allocated for plowing and drought control, for transporting bricks, tiles, lime and sand and for building houses for cooperative members. Based on the calculations of Ho Chi Minh City, in 1980, in transporting lumber alone, if the use of the existing means of river transport and rudimentary means of transportation is strengthened, there will be a reduction in the use of gasoline of almost 200 tons. At the Ninh Binh, Vong Bi, Thai Nguyen and other thermoelectric power plants, if the dry coal storage areas are maintained, if the coal crushers are serviced and used well and, at the same time, if the coal industry strives to supply coal with adequate heat value in accord with the contracts, it will be possible to conserve a notable amount of gasoline.

There are a rather large number of empty vehicles operating on the roads. At the same time, the bus depots, goods storage areas and ports lack means of transportation and, therefore, passenger and goods pile up. In many units, the numbers of loaded and unloaded transport vehicles out on the road are almost equal.

The collection of used oil in accord with the quotas has not been carried on thoroughly. Each year, if only 20 to 25 percent is recovered in accord with state quotas (the power transformer stations can recover 60 to 70 percent) and then remade, there will be approximately 4,000 more tons of primary-product lubricating oil. But the units with a good lubricating oil recovery rate, such as the Ha Bac Bridges and Roads Corporation, have recovered only 3.1 percent. Some places use the used oil to oil the brick and tile molds or they throw it away.

Used As an Exchange Material

The state has stipulated that the units in the managing ministries have the right to regulate the gasoline among themselves but there must be input from these ministries. Among the ministries and localities, to regulate things among them, the matter must be thoroughly reviewed by the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Supply. This stipulation shows that gasoline is to be managed according to the plans. But, at present, in many provinces, many people openly sell cans and bottles of gasoline right in front of the gasoline distribution stations.

Also, special use is made of gasoline as an exchange material and to create conditions to pressure others. The Port of Ha Bac agreed to work for wages but it forced the passengers to pay in gasoline, accumulating a total of almost 13 tons.

Many people have asked: "Why, since gasoline is a strategic type of good that must be purchased from abroad with foreign currency, is the gasoline not managed tightly? As for those who exceed the grain

and capital standards or who use grain or capital for the wrong purposes, the grain, banking and financial sectors have the right to stop this, make deductions or force them to pay compensation. Why can people use gasoline like this without being forced to pay compensation or having deductions made? Should the production and business enterprise units have to have additional gasoline consumption quotas for each product unit? At present, few places adequately calculate gasoline wastage per product unit and few places compare gasoline wastage with the work results and yet this valuable type of fuel is allocated based on the needs of the users.

Our country presently has a great shortage of gasoline and we must conserve each drop. The time has come when we must stipulate a clear policy: Gasoline is a strategic material uniformly managed by the state; private individuals are absolutely prohibited from selling, speculating in or hoarding gasoline.

According to Premier's Decision No 82-TTg, the gasoline supply elements subordinate to the combined materials corporation have been abolished. The General Gasoline and Oil Corporation will manage things uniformly, from receiving and transporting the gasoline to supplying it to the units. Seventeen provinces and municipalities have implemented this decision. The initial results have been rather good. Less gasoline has been diverted or held back, it has gone directly to the proper people and units in accord with the targets, transportation costs have declined and things are more convenient for the consumers.

But this is only one step forward in supplying gasoline. As for whether or not the gasoline is used effectively after it reaches the primary installations, this requires more specific policies. Using economic, administrative and educational measures, we must strive to put a stop to gasoline "bleeding" and vigorously conserve this very important type of material.

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CSO: 4209

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

SHORTCOMINGS IN POLITICAL TRAINING OUTLINED

Hanoi PAP CHI GIANG VIEN [INSTRUCTOR'S REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 4, Jul-Aug 80
pp 17-23 and 52

[Article by Nguyen Hoang: "Several Thoughts on Improving the Teaching of Political Theory Within the Party"]

[Text] Part One: The Requirements of the Political Task in the New Stage and the Objectives of Improving the Teaching of Political Theory Within the Party

I.

As a part of party building, the teaching of political theory as well as ideological activities, in general, must be based on the requirements of the political task and contribute to the successful performance of this task. In contrast to the other branches on the ideological front, with its function of providing us with basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the basic viewpoints of the party, the teaching of political theory is not only designed to meet the requirements of the immediate political task, but also to prepare for the tasks of many subsequent years. Therefore, before evaluating the situation and determining the objectives in the improvement of this work, it is necessary to clarify the requirements of the new stage of the revolution with regard to the teaching of political theory within the party.

1. Since the day that the South was liberated, socialist transformation and socialist construction in our country have been carried out in a comprehensive manner and on a nationwide scale. And, during the 1980's, our party must successfully carry out the basic tasks of the period of transition in accordance with the line of the 4th Party Congress, the essence of which is building the system of collective ownership of the working people and carrying out socialist industrialization.

This is a great leap forward, one which demands that our party correctly resolve a host of brand new problems and not only improve its general line, but, more pressingly, also resolve problems related to its positions, policies and organization of implementation within each specific area of work. To achieve the above, our party must acquire new understanding, new abilities and a new level of organization. As the resolution of the 4th Party Congress pointed out: "The task of making our country a prosperous and strong socialist country and the struggle to successfully implement the various congress resolutions face our party with extremely large responsibilities

and require that it be stronger. Our party, all cadres and party members, must not only develop increasingly high ethics, qualities and understanding, especially with regard to theory and methodology, the laws of the economy and the laws of class struggle when the party is in political power, but must also develop new capabilities in the field of organizing the socialist revolution, a field in which our party presently has many shortcomings." The teaching of political theory must be improved to help meet this demand, especially with regard to theory and methodology.

2. The reactionary authorities in China have become the immediate enemy of our people and a dangerous threat to the revolution of the people of the world. Although they have suffered a heavy defeat, they have not abandoned their scheme to commit aggression and hostile acts against our people. The struggle against the Chinese reactionaries, the immediate enemy of our people, a struggle which is closely linked to the struggle against imperialism, our basic enemy, must be continued on a long-term basis. Therefore, in conjunction with the task of accelerating socialist transformation and socialist construction, we must continue to carry out a no less fundamental and pressing task, namely, strengthening the national defense system and always being ready to fight in defense of the fatherland and fulfill our international obligation.

In this struggle, we must not only defeat every scheme of aggression and sabotage, but must also fight each of their reactionary theories, thereby helping to protect the purity of Marxism-Leninism and overcoming every harmful influence of Maoism upon some of our cadres, party members and people.

The teaching of political theory must be coordinated with the other branches on the ideological front in order to give cadres and party members a clear understanding of the reactionary nature and insidious schemes of the new enemy as well as a clear understanding of our line and position regarding them and build the determination of our cadres and party members to defeat each of their hostile actions. On the other hand, we must improve the command of political theory on the part of cadres and party members so that they are able to expose the anti-Marxist nature of the Maoists masquerading as socialists, strengthen the solidarity and oneness of mind of the entire party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the lines and policies of the party and consciously overcome the influences of Maoism in their own understanding, viewpoints and work methods.

3. In the one-half century of struggle, many generations of party members have succeeded one another within our party; some party members belong to the generation of the 1930's, some party members matured in the August Revolution and the resistance against the French colonialists, some belonged to the generation that has grown up in socialist construction and the resistance against the United States for national salvation and a new generation of party members has been forming during the past several years. This marks the inevitable passage from persons who have fought for many years and are now old to young persons. This transfer is occurring within the corps of leadership cadres now and the next 5 to 10 years will see profound changes within the structure of the corps of party members. How to insure that this transfer is carried out smoothly and well has become one of the foremost concerns in party building. In the teaching of political theory, it is now even more necessary

to look ahead to these changes in order to promptly improve both the contents and mode of education with a view toward keeping pace with the changes in the structure of the corps and helping to create a strata of strong, dependable persons to be the worthy inheritors of the strata that preceded them.

Intensifying the teaching of political theory and meeting the requirements of the political task in the new stage also mean making ideological and political preparations for the shift from one generation to the next within the party. We can and must create a new generation of party members who fully possess the character of a communist as described by Marx and Engels in the "Communist Manifesto." We also can and must create the next corps of leadership cadres, who must symbolize the political line of the party and possess the qualities and abilities required by the tasks assigned to them.

4. As a part of the international communist movement, our party, ever since the day it was established, has closely linked the revolutionary undertaking of the working class and people of Vietnam to the common undertaking of the people's of the three countries on the Indochina peninsula, to the construction and protection of socialism by the USSR and the fraternal countries and to the revolutionary movement of the working class and people of the countries struggling for national independence, democracy and socialism. We have made positive contributions to the revolutionary undertaking of the peoples of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea and to the common undertaking of the world revolution; at the same time, we have received help in many ways from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and received the widespread support of progressive forces in the world.

In the coming years, in keeping with the strategy of comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, with the communist and worker parties, we will not only continue to receive international assistance, but must also move forward to make a more positive contribution to the effort to resolve the common problems of the world revolution and be worthy of the position of the nation of Vietnam, of the Vietnam Communist Party.

In the field of political theory, we must promptly incorporate the latest achievements of the world with regard to the development of theory as well as practical application and the lessons and experiences that have been summarized in order to enrich our teaching of political theory. On the other hand, we must also take the initiative and participate in the effort to resolve the common problems now being faced within the international communist movement. This task demands that we raise the question of building a corps of cadre theorists who are highly qualified, who are not only able to summarize the diverse experiences of the Vietnamese revolution, but who also have the ability needed to participate in the effort to resolve the common theoretical problems of the world revolution.

5. On the basis of the above mentioned requirements, the questions faced in the teaching of political theory to cadres and party members in the 1960's can be summarized as follows:

a) Providing advanced training in order to improve the command of political theory on the part of cadres and party members, raising it to the level of their new tasks;

b) Helping to prepare for the change from one generation to the next among party members, the key to which is training the next corps of cadres (primarily the leadership cadres on the various levels) and raising the qualifications of party members (primarily by teaching the stratum of new party members);

c) Building a corps of cadres who are Marxist-Leninist theorists, are scientists capable of participating in research to help to resolve the theoretical questions of our country's revolution and the world revolution.

In the teaching of political theory, attention must be given to all three areas: raising the command of political theory (which includes Marxist-Leninist theory and the lines and viewpoints of the party), improving the ability to engage in practical activities (primarily the ability to concretize lines and organize and guide the implementation of these lines) and cultivating the qualities of communism, with the most important aspect at this time being helping every cadre and party member to acquire an increasingly deep understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and the lines and viewpoints of the party and acquire the ability to apply this knowledge to resolve practical problems. The cultivation of revolutionary qualities and the ability to organize and guide implementation must also rest on this basis. Because, a poor command of theory is fertile ground for opportunism of all shades. From the point of view of practical activities, a poor command of theory also leads to empiricism, to the inability to analyze and summarize experiences. In an address delivered at the ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the party, Le Duan pointed out: "The task of building the party politically and ideologically at this time is to give the organizations of the party and all cadres and party members a deep understanding of the line of the party and the ability to concretize this line in the form of correct plans and measures. To achieve this objective, the party must intensify its teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory and its line and policies to cadres and party members. We must harshly criticize and overcome erroneous viewpoints that are contrary to the line of the party; we must combat the influence of bourgeois thinking and the remnants of feudal thinking, with particular importance attached to struggling to abolish the thinking, psychology and habits of the small-scale producer. We must constantly cultivate the stand of the working class and communist ideals so that every cadre and party member is always a frontline soldier in the socialist revolution, especially in the transformation and construction of the economy, and always fully complies with the policies of the party and state."

11.

1. Teaching politics and ideology to cadres and party members is the constant task of the party organizations, a task that is carried out through many forms of study and training: in the activities of the party, in the revolutionary movement of the masses, in schools and classes (formal and on-the-job), through the books and newspapers of the party and through the other means of information and culture. In coordination with the other branches on the ideological front, the teaching of political theory (also called training and study) over the past several years has made noteworthy contributions to raising the command of political theory, improving the communist qualities and improving the ability to engage in practical activities of cadres and party members;

a) By keeping closely abreast of the political task of the party and through the various phases of political activities, through long-term and short-term classes, both formal and on-the-job, the teaching of political theory has taught cadres and party members many times about the lines and viewpoints of the party and about general issues as well as specific fields of work.

In substance, the teaching of the lines and viewpoints of the party is the teaching of the revolutionary way of thinking and acting, consequently, even though our ability to present various questions is still seriously limited, the teaching of the lines and viewpoints of the party many times has laid a firm political basis, established unity of thought and action throughout the party and helped to raise the political qualities and work ability of cadres and party members.

b) we have gradually expanded the teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory and closely linked it to the teaching of the lines of the party, thereby raising the level of consciousness of cadres and party members with regard to understanding and complying with the lines and policies of the party.

Due to the harsh nature of the struggle, both during the period of illegal activities as well as doing the two wars of resistance against France and the United States, only a small component of cadres and party members have been able to study theory. As of 1960, only 1,500 of the 4,000 middle level and high level leadership cadres of the party had studied theory in a relatively systematic fashion. Today (if we include the persons who have nearly completed their 1979 programs on the various levels), about 1 million cadres and party members are studying under the various basic programs, some 360,000 of whom (about one-fourth the total number of party members) have studied Marxist-Leninist theory on two levels: relatively systematic and general.

c) The persons to whom political theory is taught are all cadres and party members. However, in training guidelines, efforts have been concentrated first on training leadership cadres (present and future) and teaching new party members.

As a result, the number of leadership cadres who have completed their study under basic theoretical programs is higher than the number of other cadres and party members: (65 percent of high level and middle level leadership cadres, 30 to 40 percent of district level leadership cadres and 27.5 percent of basic level leadership cadres).

d) In the process of moving forward to meet the requirements of the political task, the teaching of political theory itself has undergone new stages of development:

--Once based partially on textbooks and foreign specialists, we have established political theory programs on four levels (the basic level, the elementary level, the middle level and the upper level) and compiled and distributed textbooks for all four programs.

--We have established a corps of specialized instructors and on-the-job instructors to undertake the teaching duties on the four existing program levels; some of these instructors have taught specialists and research students programs.

--we have established a system of formal party schools extending from the central to the district levels; at the same time, we have gradually developed the system of on-the-job schools and classes within the various sectors and levels and at many basic units.

--we have issued a system of standards, regulations and policies designed to gradually put the study of theory on a regular basis.

This new work is only in the initial stage and there are many things that must be examined, revised and improved upon; however, the jobs that have been performed mark a new stage of development in the teaching of political theory and have laid the necessary foundations for future stages of development.

2. However, the results that have been achieved still fall far short of meeting the requirements of the political task in the new stage. This is evident in two areas: the scale and the quality of training.

Examined from the point of view of the scale of training, we have not met the requirement of studying theory within the party and the command of political theory on the part of many cadres and party members has been improved slowly. The training of the next corps of leadership cadres still lacks planning and has not been carried out in a positive manner; the promotion of cadres (or the election to party committee echelons) before they have been sent for training is still a widespread phenomenon. There is a shortage of research cadres and instructors of theory and these persons are weak in their own command of theory.

On the other hand, in educational work, although cadres and party members have been provided with new knowledge of theory, lines and the organization and implementation of lines, this knowledge has stopped at principles, viewpoints and general knowledge and not been properly applied to help resolve practical problems. For this reason, although their understanding of political theory has been raised, changes in the forging of communist qualities and work skills have not been very marked. This is one of the reasons why there has not been a strong impact upon the movement even though many persons are studying; why there is a high level of unanimity concerning the line but many deviations when it comes to concretizing and complying with this line; and why the political qualities of the mass of cadres and party members are, general speaking, good but very serious negative phenomena still exist and are being corrected slowly.

Thus, in the areas of knowledge, ability and qualities, the preparing of cadres and party members for the new stage has not been carried out well. An important reason for this situation is the many shortcomings still to be found in the teaching of political theory, so many that the teaching of political theory does not fulfill its task.

a) The teaching of political theory is still based on the requirements of the immediate political task and the standardization requirements of resolution 23, which stipulate the minimum program to be studied by each type cadre and party member. However, in the organization of implementation, the teaching of political theory is marked by major shortcomings, namely, the failure to formulate planning and

plans for the elementary and advanced training of cadres and the failure to closely link the teaching of party members to the requirements of building the party and strengthening the other organizations within the dictatorship of the proletariat system during each period of time. The result has been that education has not kept pace with the requirements of the political task, educational activities are still decentralized and both their quality and effectiveness are low.

b) As regards the forms and methods of education, although it has been proposed that we make coordinated use of many educational measures, in actuality, these measures are generally taken separately and not directed toward a common objective. There is a tendency to conduct classes and only attach importance to formal schools and classes without taking positive steps to create the conditions needed to expand on-the-job study, especially for cadres studying under the middle level and high level programs. This is not only a shortcoming regarding understanding, but primarily a shortcoming in the organization of implementation.

c) The subjects being taught (in political activities and at schools and classes) are still simple in nature and the volume of knowledge being provided does not meet proposed training objectives. Compared to the curricula supplied by the fraternal parties, our curricula do not reflect the latest achievements of the world (in existing subjects) and completely lack a number of necessary subjects for leadership cadres. This is not to mention that our curricula are not truly effective because they stop at general principles and viewpoints, do not deeply delve into theoretical problems raised by everyday life and do not truly improve the work skills of cadres and party members.

The methods of teaching are still dry and monotonous, depend heavily upon explanations and do not encourage independent thinking or democratic discussion among students; both teaching and learning heavily emphasize theory and books without attaching importance to examining and resolving the burning questions being faced in the work and the thinking of the student. As a result, the student might learn some new knowledge, but is not able to use it as a scientific method for analyzing, evaluating and resolving concrete problems in his practical activities.

d) The corps of instructors is still insufficient in size and quality. Compared to the staff that has been approved, the number of professional instructors in the faculties directly subordinate to the central level numbers only slightly more than one-half (nearly 700/1,200) and slightly more than one-third at the provincial party schools (nearly 500/2,000). The knowledge of many instructors is limited, usually only one level higher than the program they are teaching; sometimes, cadres must instruct other persons in the program they themselves just completed. Because there is a shortage of instructors, many schools and classes are opened, activities are decentralized and there is a lack of a division of labor and cooperation, instructors must teach many lessons and they do not have the time needed to research the actual situation, conduct scientific research and prepare their lessons.

The activities of the corps of on-the-job instructors appointed by the various party committee echelons are irregular. Although these instructors have the advantage of having a grasp of practice, few have received training in theory and their profession, consequently, the quality of their instruction is also limited.

e) The system of formal and on-the-job party schools that has been constructed is closely linked to the guidance provided by the various party committee echelons; however, there are certain matters that must be re-examined in planning and the division of management echelons. A clear line has not been drawn between the subject matter taught in the political theory classes of the party school system and the state school system, consequently, many cadres and party members must reread the same program. The mode of operation of party schools is also dry and monotonous; formal schools only hold formal classes and have no interesting, on-the-job branches of study. Within the on-the-job party schools, organization, subject matter and mode of operation are patterned after the formal party schools. The technical equipment used in instruction is still rudimentary (instruction is usually nothing more than verbal instruction). In this area, there is still a rather large gap between party schools and the schools of the state.

III.

The 4th Congress of the Party set forth the task regarding ideological work within the party as "giving cadres and party members a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the party congress, basically raising their political level and tapping their spirit of self-awareness in their activities." and, the guideline for improving ideological work is "more thoroughly implementing the principle of theory combined with practice, insuring that subject matter is both fully scientific and militant and molding a scientific, independent and creative style of thinking on the part of the student."

In keeping with the task and guidelines set forth by the congress regarding the improvement of the teaching of political theory and on the basis of the requirements of the political task in the 1980's and the present situation surrounding educational work, it is possible to set forth the elements involved in the improvement of the teaching of political theory as follows:

- 1) In order to put the teaching of political theory under planning and plans, it is necessary to clearly establish the educational requirements regarding each type cadre, party member and Youth Union member and, on this basis, formulate plans for the training of cadres and the teaching of party members that are closely linked to the 5-year economic, cultural and social development plans (as well as to the various party congresses).

- 2) In order to improve the contents and methods of education, it is necessary to establish a new system of political theory educational programs to replace the system of programs that was established in 1972 and is still in use. On the basis of this new system of programs, we must compile new textbooks.

As regards educational methods, we must review the educational experiences of our party, investigate the experiences of the fraternal countries and gradually build the profession of teaching, instructing and studying political theory within the party.

- 3) The corps of specialized and on-the-job instructors must be organized along specialized lines and receive regular training so that they are able to meet the requirements of learning political theory within the party and in society.

4) We must consolidate the system of formal party schools placed under the direct leadership of the various party committee echelons so that these schools truly become educational tools and organizational tools of the party. We must expand the system of on-the-job schools and classes and coordinate the use of other measures in order to intensify the teaching of political theory in all sectors, on all levels and at each basic unit; we must strengthen the material bases and provide the means needed for the educational work of the party.

5) We must improve the management of the teaching of political theory within the party and throughout society in the following areas: the organizational structure, the mode of management, the formulation of regulations and policies, instruction and learning. The objectives of this improvement are to insure unified management by the party in the teaching of political theory, put the study of political theory on a regular basis, gradually modernize it and begin using diplomas and scientific titles such as those used in the other fields of study.

(To be continued)

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

MORE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, FEWER SUBSIDIES URGED

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[Article: "Understanding the Basic Viewpoints of the Party With Regard To Examining and Resolving Problems in Distribution and Circulation"]

[Text] Distribution and circulation play a very important role. Marx very correctly stated: production determines distribution, circulation and consumption, the production system determines the distribution system and the level of production determines the level of distribution and consumption. At the same time, distribution, circulation and consumption have a reciprocal effect upon production, either stimulating or restricting its development. In view of the facts that we are advancing directly from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production, experienced many years of war and now still face the threat of war, our economic situation is one involving many difficulties. Therefore, in order to stabilize distribution and circulation, we must always firmly adhere to the principle of developing production with increasingly high productivity and returns. Without a very good plan for building the structure of the economy and developing production there can be no material basis for good distribution and circulation; conversely, without a correct mode of distribution and a correct circulation system, it is impossible to stimulate production, impossible to develop the potentials of production, impossible to formulate positive plans and implement plan norms well and impossible to competently contribute to the formation of the industrial-agricultural structure. For this reason, the problem of distribution and circulation has become a pressing problem that must be resolved.

Distribution and circulation are of a very highly integrated nature and reflect the basic economic relationships and the important political relationships of society. The relationship between industry and agriculture, the relationship between the central level and the local level, the relationships among all the people, the collective and the individual, the policy of the party regarding manual workers, farmers and intellectuals, the policy regarding the city and the countryside and so forth are concretely expressed in the distribution and circulation policy. The struggle over "who defeats whom" which exists between the two ways of life is also most clearly evident in the field of distribution and circulation. As a result, whether the distribution and circulation problem is resolved well or not, it not only

has an impact upon production, but also influences the implementation of the lines and policies of the party and the superior nature of our system.

The improvement of distribution and circulation involves an arduous, complex revolutionary struggle, one that demands that a variety of measures be taken in a systematic manner based on a scientific set of procedures. It also involves matters related to the interests of millions of persons, especially manual workers and farmers, and demands that many sectors on all echelons work together and that a high degree of unanimity is achieved from within the party and the corps of state cadres to the people.

Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic viewpoints of the party with regard to improving circulation and distribution is a matter of foremost importance.

The objectives of the improvement of distribution and circulation in the years to come are:

1. Stimulating production, primarily agricultural production and providing incentive for higher labor productivity and higher economic returns so that manual workers and farmers develop production with peace of mind and enthusiasm and produce much wealth for society;
2. Stabilizing the financial system, the circulation of money and the market, strengthening the state's control over the sources of commodities and strengthening and developing the socialist economic segment;
3. Efficiently distributing the social product and national income on a society-wide scale and maintaining and gradually improving the standard of living of the workers within the state and collective sectors, primarily manual workers, cadres and the people in areas ravaged by the war and serious natural disasters.

To insure that the above mentioned objectives are met, it is necessary to thoroughly understand the basic viewpoints of the party with regard to resolving the various problems regarding distribution and circulation with a view toward achieving true unanimity in thought and action, creating correct public opinion and developing powerful activist forces, thereby insuring the good implementation of the party's positions and policies regarding distribution and circulation.

1. We Must Place and Resolve the Problems of Distribution and Circulation Within the Framework of the Entire National Economy, the Political-Economic-Social System and the Overall Situation Surrounding Our People's Revolutionary Undertaking

a) We must firmly grasp and apply the viewpoint concerning the unity between politics and the economy and correctly establish the various relationships between the economy and the other areas of activity; we must be fully aware of the position of the economy as the foundation and the decisive role it plays, primarily in production; at the same time, we must realize the very large impact of the situation and of political, cultural and social activities upon the economy. In our country at this time, these various areas of activity overlap and intermix with one another.

As Lenin said, politics occupies the leading position (has priority) over the economy, but politics is the vivid expression of the economy and the economy, most directly distribution and circulation, becomes the political matter of foremost importance.

The economy must be placed against the background of the entire political-economic-social system in order to:

- Accurately establish the objectives, tasks and comprehensive measures of the entire national economy;

- Mobilize the combined strength of our system for practical action;

- Develop upon the impact of the achievements recorded in each area in order to create an overall impact, a combined strength for mobilizing the entire party and all the people to struggle with renewed revolutionary spirit to overcome every difficulty and shortcoming and successfully fulfill the objectives and tasks that have been set forth.

b) We must correct the viewpoint of raising and resolving economic problems in an isolated, onesided manner as well as the opposite viewpoint, namely, that of raising and resolving political, cultural and social questions in a manner not closely linked to or based upon the economy as a result of which we fail to fully realize the nature of the situation, fail to correctly determine the problems that exist, fail to correctly evaluate advantages and difficulties, fail to see causes and solutions and, in actuality, waste tremendous forces that could be mobilized and weaken ourselves.

The purpose of placing the economy within the framework of society as a whole is to see solutions more clearly and correctly, not to dilute problems and decentralize our forces, but to concentrate our efforts on resolving problems related to the economy, which is the foundation of society. The correct solution of socio-political questions must also be based on the foundation of the economy and socio-political forces must, when mobilized in economic activities, comply with the various economic laws, become economic forces, have an impact upon the development of production and strengthen the position of the socialist economy.

c) In the overall situation surrounding our country's revolution at this time, the implementation of the positions and policies regarding distribution and circulation is a part of the struggle between the two ways of life that is taking place in our country in the initial stage of the period of transition, a stage in which the economy still consists of many different segments and is in the process of advancing from small-scale production directly to large-scale socialist production.

The basic spirit of our party's positions and policies concerning circulation and distribution at this time is:

- Constantly strengthening and developing the socialist economy and maintaining and strongly developing the dominant role played by it vis-a-vis the other segments of the economy;

--Improving the management capabilities of the state in order to make correct use of and closely inspect the various segments of the economy, thereby insuring the full utilization of every capability that lies in the equipment, the sources of capital, the technical skills and the business finances of every force and every person for the sake of the interests of building socialism;

--Developing upon revolutionary, positive, wholesome factors within our economy and society;

--Resolutely sweeping away reactionary, hostile factors and powers;

--Abolishing the bad, blocking and repulsing the negative, transforming the backward and the outmoded.

In this spirit, the struggle to resolve the problems related to distribution and circulation is truly a revolutionary struggle, one that demands that we firmly maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and uphold the right of collective ownership of the working people.

--It is necessary to harshly punish illegal bourgeois business powers who support hostile elements and create disruptions within the economy and social life;

--We must resolutely punish speculators, smugglers, thieves, hoodlums and gangsters as well as elements within the corps of cadres and manual workers who degenerate and become deviant and support speculators, smugglers, thieves and so forth.

In this struggle, the most important issue, the issue of most decisive significance is the need to build the socialist economy well, to develop and strengthen it so that it is pure and wholesome and displays both its superiority and strength. We must further develop the management role, function and capability of the dictatorship of the proletariat state.

--It is necessary to carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture and private capitalist industry and commerce in a correct manner and reorganize small producers and small merchants to insure that the state eliminates all bourgeois powers and establishes direct economic relations with farmers, handicraftsmen, artisans and the small merchants who have business licenses. As regards persons still earning their living privately, the state will permit them to produce and do business and assist them in their production and business; at the same time, the state must tightly manage and inspect them, not tolerate anything illegal and not permit them to earn excessively high, unreasonable incomes, including law abiding laborers.

d) This revolutionary struggle demands that every organization of the party, every agency of the state, army and public security sector, every echelon of the mass organizations and every revolutionary cadre always firmly adheres to the viewpoint of the whole, that is, to the viewpoint that the economy consists of the entire national economy, tries to see the common objectives and requirements of the entire economy and implements a system that closely links the interests of society, the collective and each laborer as one.

We must combat the mentality of partialism, localism and decentralization, combat superficial, narrowminded points of view and combat the practice of jealously guarding one's unit, sector or locality, even competing against one another and taking everything possible from the state, thereby creating loopholes to be used and exacerbated by decadent elements.

2. It Is Necessary To Raise and Resolve Problems Related to Distribution and Circulation Against the Background of the Reciprocal Relationship and Impact Among Production, Distribution, Circulation and Consumption

a) According to the concept of Marx and Engels, production, distribution, circulation (trade) and consumption are the parts of the reproduction process, are the divisions within a unified bloc in which production is the basis and determines distribution, circulation and consumption; conversely, distribution, circulation and consumption, in turn, have the effect of stimulating or restricting the development of production. Marx considered "this to be the case with every organic entity."

In a process of reproduction, distribution and circulation are the same as the stages following production and are totally dependent upon production. However, if distribution and circulation are viewed in a process of continuous and repeated reproduction, the question becomes totally different. According to Marx: before the distribution of products, there are the 1) distribution of production tools and 2) the distribution of members of society by type of production, which encompasses the process of production and determines the structure of production. As regards circulation, which is considered "the means for producing the product," Marx also considered it to be "an act of production." Thus, according to Marx, if distribution and circulation are considered to be the distribution and circulation of the products that have been produced, in general, they are the stages that follow production and are dependent upon production; however, if they are considered to be the distribution and circulation of the instruments of production, they are the prerequisites, the premises to production, are part of production and determine the structure of production.

With this in mind, we further emphasize the viewpoint: production is the foundation and, to resolve distribution and circulation problems, it is necessary to develop production. However, the prerequisite to developing production, in addition to the factors of production itself, is to resolve the problems related to distribution and circulation well. Only by distributing and circulating the instruments of production well (through investments in capital construction, through the supply organization and so forth) is it possible to change the structure of the economy and heighten the returns from production. Only by distributing and circulating consumer goods well is it possible to ensure the replenishment of energies expended in labor, stimulate the desire to work and provide incentive for the redistribution of labor. To desire to develop production and only talk about production itself is to not understand the reciprocal and decisive relationship and impact between production and distribution-circulation; as a result of this misunderstanding, production not only fails to develop as desired, but might also decline. Here, we must have an even deeper understanding of the words of Marx: "To examine production without giving attention to the distribution encompassed within production is clearly an empty abstraction."

In the work of establishing and improving policies and regulations governing management, distribution and circulation, it is necessary to correctly apply the reciprocal relationship between production and distribution-circulation. Distribution and circulation policies and regulations and the extent of distribution must be based on the form and level of development of production. At the same time, correct distribution and circulation must be used to create the conditions for and stimulate the development of production with increasingly high productivity and returns.

b) Correctly realizing the position of distribution and circulation and correctly applying the reciprocal relationship between production and distribution-circulation are very complex economic matters in terms of theory as well as practice, especially under the conditions of our country, which is advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production and still has many different economic segments; meanwhile, the knowledge that our cadres have concerning this matter is very small and frequently one-sided, consequently, they do not employ it to stimulate production and support everyday life. We have not made good use of the various tools of distribution and circulation, have allowed many shortcomings to develop with the result that the state does not control commodities and money and have not maintained the unity of the three interests, thereby creating additional difficulties for production and everyday life, causing imbalance within the economy and creating the conditions for the negative factors within society to develop.

On the basis of this correct viewpoint and in view of the present situation, we must firmly rely upon the foundation, that is, must develop production and produce efficiently, not simply produce products at any cost. This is the basis for developing sources of commodities with which to improve the standard of living, developing sources of revenue and developing material bases to regulate the circulation of money; and, it is also the basis for improving the field of distribution and circulation. It is even more necessary that the improvement of distribution and circulation be directed toward the basic, long-range as well as immediate objective of supporting and stimulating production as stated in the resolution of the 6th Party Plenum: the highest standard for evaluating the correctness of policies is whether or not they develop production, raise labor productivity and improve the standard of living.

On the other hand, however, we cannot wait until production has developed before resolving the problems of distribution and circulation, rather, we must take the initiative and gradually improve distribution and circulation.

In a number of areas, distribution and circulation are of decisive significance; they open the way for and stimulate the development of production, stabilize and improve the standard of living, efficiently regulate the distribution of national income and create a new balance for the national economy to develop smoothly.

3. Resolving Distribution and Circulation Problems by Making Use of the Combined Strength of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Upholding the Right of Collective Ownership of the Working People, Using the Alliance of Workers and Farmers as the Nucleus of This Effort.

a) As the main tool in the leadership of the party and the right of collective ownership of the working people, our dictatorship of the proletariat state manage

the entire national economy by means of the combined strength of politics, the economy, the law, the national defense system, the culture, society, the strength of the people, the strength of the party and the strength of the mass organizations.

To manage the national economy, the state must:

--Control the sources of materials, which consist of: the primary instruments of production, the strategic materials and a large quantity of consumer goods (agricultural and industrial products), especially essential consumer goods;

--Control adequate financial resources for socialist construction, the development of the economy and culture and the strengthening of the national defense system;

--Control production, distribution and circulation, control the market and control the flow of money.

What the state controls cannot, of course, simply be based on subjective desires, rather, it must be based on the entire strength of the system, on the level of development of production forces and production relations and on the management capabilities of the corps of cadres. Doing good work within the field of distribution and circulation is an extremely important prerequisite to the state managing the national economy well.

We do not maintain that the state's management of the entire national economy means that the state must manage and control every activity, every economic product, from the largest to the smallest. Nor do we advocate that the state control more than it can and must control because this would only lead to restrictive, crude measures and a sweeping supply system and, in actuality, still result in no control by the state.

However, whatever is of strategic importance today and tomorrow, whatever is of key importance in production and whatever is essential in the daily lives of the people absolutely must be controlled by our state and to prevent the state from controlling what it can control is both a mistake and dangerous (state control and management do not mean that everything is centralized on the central level; we have three basic elements of collective ownership: the entire country, the locality and the installation).

b) Problems related to distribution and circulation must be resolved on the basis of tapping the strength of the system of collective ownership of the working people, the nucleus of which is the alliance of workers and farmers. To accomplish this, we must coordinate the basic and long-range interests of both the working class and the class of farmers and must rely upon the extremely large strength arising from the alliance between these two classes.

To strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers economically through distribution and circulation, we must resolve a host of very important issues related to the national economy, such as distributing national income to the capital accumulation fund and the consumption fund; distributing capital for capital construction to the various sectors of the national economy and between the two basic sectors (industry

and agriculture) with a view toward building the industrial-agricultural economic structure; caring for the daily lives of these two classes and maintaining an appropriate ratio between their incomes; helping agriculture and the class of farmers by supplying instruments of production, providing loans, selling consumer goods and so forth while gaining the voluntary participation of farmers in the collective way of life in order to constantly develop production and advance agriculture to large-scale socialist production; implementing suitable tax, purchasing and price policies in order to centralize an appropriate number of sources of agricultural products and provide capital for socialist industrialization, etc.

As Lenin said: "We must align ourselves with the peasantry, with ordinary working farmers and must proceed very slowly, much more slowly than we previously thought; however, we must proceed in such a way that all peasants truly move forward with us. And, the time will come when this movement will advance rapidly, more rapidly than we now think possible"(the Political Report at the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party(b)). To accomplish this, we must take practical actions that truly benefit farmers and persuade and gain the participation of farmers by means of suitable forms of organization, stages of development and methods of working.

An important part of the economic substance of this alliance is the result of trade, in the forms of value and commodities, through commodity-money relations and through the market. Therefore, we must always have a firm grasp of the essence of the issue, that is, establishing, strengthening and developing the socialist collective ownership role of the two basic classes of society, workers and farmers, with the working class playing the leading role. A correct policy is one that strengthens this leadership role not only by means of propaganda and political education, but also by means of economic activities. Distribution and circulation have the practical effect of helping farmers to develop production, improve their daily lives, become true masters in politics, the economy, society and so forth. Only in this way do farmers feel assured, produce with enthusiasm, eagerly contribute to the state, voluntarily and actively embark on the course of earning a living collectively and join the working class in building the modern industrial-agricultural economic structure.

c) We must combat the viewpoint of socializing society in a bureaucratic, narrowminded, subjective and perfunctory manner, the primary manifestations of which are:

--As regards the policy toward state-operated enterprises and cooperatives, placing heavy emphasis upon increasing both their number and form so that we bring very many state-operated enterprises and cooperatives into existence, "the more the better," without giving attention to their substance, giving light attention to economic returns and ignoring quality;

--With regard to the policy concerning private and individual production, placing heavy emphasis upon "wiping them out" and "strangling them" so that they are eliminated very rapidly, "the quicker, the better";

--With regard to measures, placing heavy emphasis upon bureaucratic, crude and purely administrative measures and upon a sweeping supply system.

The tragic consequences of this viewpoint are:

--As regards the socialist economy, although the intent is to support and strengthen it, it is actually deprived of the ability to display its superior nature, its prestige is diminished and it is restricted and hampered, not allowed to burst forth and develop in the correct direction;

--As regards the private and individual economy, its capabilities are not used nor are they tightly managed, consequently, it is forced to be deceptive and engage in illegal activities;

--As regards socialist economic life, in general, production declines and stagnates, distribution is unfair and circulation is impeded by a "stream of prohibitions." With this method of operating, both the state and the working people encounter difficulties while dishonest merchants are allowed to operate freely, thereby posing obstacles to production, creating difficulties in everyday life and causing concerns among society.

We must also criticize the unprincipled viewpoint, the main characteristics of which are:

--A desire to limit and stop the development of the socialist economy (without distinguishing between whether this development is proper or hasty and perfunctory); maintaining that primarily the private and individual economy should "burst forth" in "appropriate" development and maintaining that this is the only way to develop production and reduce tight market supply;

--With regard to measures, placing too much emphasis upon the market device, reducing the role played by administrative measures, giving light attention to inventory and control or narrowing the scope and reducing the level of management and control to the point where they no longer insure efficient administrative management by the state.

A number of comrades, misunderstanding the resolution of the 6th Party Plenum, have allowed private commerce to "burst forth" more than production, thereby causing production to be even more disrupted, causing distribution and circulation to be more disorganized, causing small-scale production to develop while ignoring large-scale production, causing private production to weaken state-operated and collective production, etc.

4. The Resolution of Problems Related to Distribution and Circulation Must Be Closely Linked to the Continuation of Socialist Transformation, the Close Coordination of Transformation with Construction and the Reorganization of Social Production

a) Coordinating transformation with construction is a basic viewpoint of the party, one established at the 4th Congress, one that guides all economic activities, most directly distribution and circulation.

From the point of view of the transformation of production relations, socialist transformation itself encompasses distribution and circulation: the redistribution of the instruments of production (to whom do they belong?), the distribution of national income and the social product (the interests of which class is the use of national income to serve, who controls goods, who controls money, the interests of which class is the use of money and goods to serve and, as a result, with which principles must distribution comply?) and the organization of the circulation of goods (who is the master of the market?).

In our country, transformation must be closely linked to construction because the objective of transformation is to build the socialist economy and, in order to carry out transformation well, we must accelerate construction in order to strengthen the position of socialism in terms of both production forces and production relations.

The viewpoint of coordinating transformation with construction must be fully implemented in the effort to resolve problems related to distribution and circulation. We must transform non-socialist distribution and circulation relations in coordination with building socialist distribution and circulation relations in order to limit and eventually abolish capitalist exploitation, regulate illegitimate income, sever the economic ties between the bourgeoisie and farmers, handicraftsmen and artisans, prevent and eliminate speculation and smuggling and broaden socialist commerce. Doing this will create favorable conditions for transformation and construction.

In the socialist revolution, the alliance of workers and farmers, the most important element of which is their economic alliance, is a principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the condition determining victory. This alliance is most evident in the field of distribution and circulation: in the trade of products between agriculture and industry, in the state's financial and technical assistance to agriculture, in the contribution by farmers of accumulated capital for industrialization, in the improvement of the standard of living of workers and farmers and so forth, consequently, only by carrying out both transformation and construction well in the field of distribution and circulation is it possible to strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers, which is the firm guarantee of victory in the entire undertaking of carrying out transformation and building socialism.

The line and major policies of our party concerning socialist transformation are correct.

With agriculture, gaining the participation of farmers in the collective way of life in the South and perfecting the new production relations in the North are a strategic task and major job of our party and state. This task involves an arduous, complex struggle between the two ways of life of advancing to socialism or experiencing spontaneous capitalist development, between earning a living collectively and earning a living privately, a struggle that will have a profound impact upon the interests and habits of private ownership and completely change the method of earning a living and the lifestyle of every person.

We never maintain that the objective of agricultural cooperativization is solely to facilitate the collection of taxes and the purchasing of agricultural products.

However, we do recognize that if we do not organize farmers in the collective way of life, the impact of the habits of small-scale production, the relationships of the commodity economy to bourgeoisie in commerce and small merchants, the reaction by the various strata of exploiters and the attempts at sabotage by the various types of reactionaries will surely cause us to encounter numerous difficulties in all areas of work, especially in purchasing activities in the rural areas of the South, thereby affecting the economic situation of the entire country.

As regards private, capitalist industry, socialist transformation must be carried out through suitable forms of state capitalism, the most highly developed form being the joint public-private enterprise (it is not the only form, however, and should not be misunderstood to be a state-operated enterprise in substance).

Lenin said that we must know how to use and transform the capitalists, even learn from them in order to win victory over them on the economic front. The course to be followed and the form to be employed are state capitalism, which is capitalism closely linked to the socialist state, a type of capitalism on which we can set limits; it is more progressive than the economy of small-scale, decentralized, disorganized producers who seek to evade control by the state; it is an intermediary step to socialism. We have the government, have economic forces; what we lack is "skill" in management, in business, in commerce.

The process of the socialist transformation of private capitalism is, at the same time, the process of reorganizing production and circulation and readjusting the distribution of income, especially the income of those capitalists who refuse to be transformed and are opposing our distribution policy, engaging in acts of speculation, smuggling and the undermining of prices, competing in the purchasing of goods and so forth.

As regards the artisan and handicraft sector and the various services needed by society, we must reorganize them by sector under the management of the state and apply suitable forms of transformation and production based on the characteristics of each sector and trade.

To improve distribution and circulation along the lines of socialism, we must intensify the transformation of commerce. It is necessary to immediately abolish capitalist commerce, build and develop socialist commerce, gradually shift unnecessary merchants to production and narrow the scope of the private market, which is now too broad and unwholesome. Those merchants who are allowed to continue to do business must be closely managed and inspected and the management of the market must be strengthened.

The transformation of agriculture, the transformation of private, capitalist industry and commerce and the transformation of the artisan and handicraft sectors are closely linked to and have an impact upon one another. They are also closely linked to and have a reciprocal impact upon the construction and development of the state-operated economy. This is the concrete manifestation of the processes of socialist transformation and socialist construction in each element of the unified reproduction process, which includes both distribution and circulation. Our party has pointed out:

--The ultimate objective of transformation is also the objective of distribution and circulation, namely, to develop production and insure that the state controls the majority of the sources of goods, thereby helping to improve the living standard of the people.

--The basic elements of transformation are also closely linked to distribution and circulation, that is, changing the system of the private ownership of the instruments of production and the products that are produced is closely linked to reorganizing production, reorganizing distribution and circulation, closely coordinating transformation with construction and simultaneously carrying out the transformation of the private and individual economy by expanding the position of the socialist economy and displaying its superior nature in the field of production as well as in distribution and circulation.

--in transformation, we must fully respect the principles of transformation, fully prepare the conditions and premises required, adopt specific, correct policies (primarily policies on distribution and circulation) regarding the various strata and in order to deal with each type problem and employ suitable forms, measures and stages for each area.

b) We must continue and correctly accelerate socialist transformation, must combat the practices of carrying out transformation under pressure or orders, carrying it out in a simple, impetuous manner, in a hasty, form for form's sake manner, separating transformation from construction and separating production relations from production forces, which lead to the results of a decline in production, obstacles to circulation, a reduction in the volume of products and a lack of eagerness and enthusiasm on the part of laborers for production. We have learned profound lessons in the countryside as well as the cities. These lessons must have the effect of helping us to realize what must be continued in order to develop upon the achievements that have been recorded and rectify mistakes and shortcomings.

At the same time, we must combat the attitude of hesitating, wavering and postponing the transformation of agriculture and the attitude of laxity toward commerce.

As regards the transformation of agriculture, the resolution of the 6th Party Plenum set forth the guideline of carrying out transformation in a positive and steady manner; at present, we must emphasize "steady." Steady does not mean stopping and not carrying out transformation or remaining at the level of work exchange teams, which, in substance, would mean the postponement of cooperativization; nor does it mean disbanding the organizations which the party has worked so hard to build, even though they are still weak. Steady means actively working in the correct manner, correcting mistakes that have been made and never working in a sloppy, hasty manner.

In commerce, we have lacked appropriate economic measures in the recent past and have been lax in the administrative management necessary for the private sector. The state is very inept at collecting taxes and controlling the sources of goods through purchases, many materials are stolen or lost, the free market is encroaching upon the organized market and both speculation and smuggling are on the rise.

Both of the deviations mentioned above (orders and pressure as well as laxity) are occurring. Mistakes, wherever they are found, must be rectified, must be made into things that are correct; we must firmly adhere to that which is correct, not be unsteady or unstable, not shift from one deviation to another and cause ourselves to bear the negative consequences of both types of deviations.

5. The Improvement of Distribution and Circulation Must Be Carried Out Within the Framework of Improving the Entire System of Economic Management, Shifting from the Administrative-Supply Style to the Socialist Mode of Business, Using Planning as the Primary Basis, Correctly Applying Commodity-Monetary Relations and Correctly Coordinating the Three Types of Measures (Economic, Administrative and Educational)

a) During the period of transition to socialism and throughout the entire stage of socialism, distribution and circulation are primarily manifested in the form of commodity-money relations. However, these commodity-money relations do not have a spontaneous impact, rather, they have an organized, planned impact. This is something that no one in our country (and the other socialist countries) can doubt or oppose. The problem lies in how and to what extent these relations should be applied under the present conditions of our country. This issue is usually referred to as the "plan and market" issue.

We would like to make a number of statements in the nature of viewpoints:

1. We must widely apply commodity-money relations both within and outside the plan (for this reason, we say that they must be applied in management and planning); applying commodity-money relations within the plan is the principal, most important element, is the factor that brings the most improvements to the mode of management and the greatest effectiveness in production and business.

2. The primary elements involved in applying commodity-money relations within the plan are:

--Closely linking centralized planning from the central level in terms of the primary objectives, tasks and balances of the plan with cost accounting, that is, establishing the right of financial independence of the installations and economic units and broadening the planning initiative of the installations and economic units with regard to production within their plans, over and above their plans and outside their plans (assigned by the upper level). In our country, this is something that must be done gradually, must be done through a process.

--On all planning levels, it is necessary to unify the material resources plan and the value plan, unify the production, technical, supply, marketing and financial plans in one system, strengthen qualitative norms, attach importance to economic returns, heighten the role played by profits, enterprise funds, the various types of bonuses and so forth so that the enterprise collective and the worker concern themselves with the results of production and business.

--On all planning levels, it is necessary to closely link the plan to the policies governing the various economic levers as soon as the plan is being formulated; levers should not be merely employed as a measure designed to insure implementation of the plan once it has been formulated.

On all planning levels, it is necessary to use suitable methods and forms of planning in order to closely link production to distribution and circulation, heighten the role and impact of the economic contract, strengthen the role of understanding consumer needs and the needs of the market and heightening the impact of distribution and circulation upon production.

It must be realized that our centralized planning on the central level has the shortcoming of being heavily administrative (bureaucratic) and characterized by subsidies in the areas of specific norms while being very rudimentary and deficient in the area of basic, long-range matters, matters which the centralized planning of the national economy must resolve. Our system of planning echelons, which is marked by bureaucracy and subsidization as well as loopholes, causes the actual impact of the plan to be very poor.

Therefore, the problem is not simply that of narrowing the scope of planning, but bringing planning up to date so that it is flexible, correct and reasonable and has both a practical impact and effect.

3. As regards production, distribution, circulation and consumption outside the plan, the state applies the commodity-money relations to determine suitable economic management policies (to serve as the foundation for administrative and educational measures) and coordinates the three types of measures in order to provide incentive for earning a living legitimately, developing production in accordance with the law and, at the same time, preventing disruptive activities.

Setting rates of taxation, establishing the obligation to sell products to the state at stipulated prices, making it mandatory to open accounts at the bank and be under the cash management of the state, making it mandatory to publicly post prices and so forth, all of these are involved in applying commodity-money relations in the management of the private and individual economy with a view toward providing incentive for them to operate in accordance with the guidelines of the state plan. These elements are implemented through a variety of forms and measures, such as laws of the state, management and inspection activities of the financial, banking, price and commerce agencies, the mobilization and education activities of the mass organizations, the impact of public opinion and, when necessary, intervention by the agencies of the dictatorship of the proletariat: the public security sector, the courts, etc.

b) We must know how to use the three types of measures, economic, administrative and educational, of which correct economic measures that accurately reflect the requirements of the economic laws are the foundation, the basis for insuring high effectiveness in the use of administrative measures and a good impact by educational measures.

We place emphasis upon taking inventories, performing control work and practicing cost accounting, but not inventories and control work of a bureaucratic, perfunctory, crude manner, rather, inventories and control work that go to the heart of the matter and are based on correct economic solutions.

By correctly coordinating the three types of measures, the state insures that the entire economy develops within the orb of socialism and in the direction of the state plan and laws; the state primarily causes the state-operated economy and the cooperative economy to develop in the correct direction. On this basis, the state controls goods, controls money and brings distribution and circulation within the orb of socialism.

c) We must take determined steps to abolish the bureaucratic, subsidization style of management, a style that shows disregard for economic laws and economic returns, gives light attention to the use of commodity-money relations, places heavy emphasis upon management and planning on the basis of material resources, on only developing vertical, administrative relations, thereby strangling horizontal, economic relations and so forth.

The malady of bureaucratic subsidization has reduced the zeal and ability of many cadres, caused the administrative apparatus to constantly grow, nurtured laziness, irresponsibility and a lack of discipline and restricted the display of the abilities and talents of many good cadres.

At the same time, we must harshly criticize the viewpoint of wanting to reduce the role played by planning, to simply narrow the scope of planning.

In substance, this viewpoint is the denial of the central role played by the plan within the management system and places the market above the plan so that it controls the economy. Placing heavy emphasis upon cost accounting, that is, upon the financial independence of installations and economic units while giving light attention to centralized planning from the central level is the same as advocating "self-government." This viewpoint demands that the state-operated enterprises practice sweeping commercial cost accounting (not commercial cost accounting with strict limits, conditions and control by the state as stipulated by the government); demands the purchasing of grain and agricultural products primarily at negotiated prices (based totally upon the market, upon the law of value); and demands the excessive expansion of the unorganized market, the market outside the plan.

If, as Lenin criticized, the measures of using orders and exerting pressure in order to abolish the market are "stupid and suicidal," the measure of "unleashing" the market device is a no less "suicidal" action.

d. Redistributing National Income on a Society-Wide Scale in Accordance with the Three Strategic Tasks and on the Basis of Correctly Coordinating the Three Types of Interests and Implementing the Principle of Distribution in Accordance with Labor

a) Our socialist construction is characterized by two factors not found in the other countries:

First, we are building the economy in a country that experienced several decades of war and still faces the threat of war, thereby making it necessary for our people to constantly maintain combat readiness.

Secondly, we are advancing from a system of small-scale production, which has no heavy machine industry, to large-scale socialist production; however, we must immediately carry out the two basic tasks of satisfying the daily needs of the people and accumulating capital in order to build the material-technical bases of socialism.

In addition, our international task is very weighty.

The need to accumulate capital for industrialization, the need to improve the standard of living, the needs of the national defense system and our international obligations are very large, but our capabilities are limited. This is an extremely sharp contradiction which we must resolve by closely linking two factors, that is, making every effort to accelerate production and resolving the distribution problem well: we must again raise the question of distribution on a society-wide scale and must rebalance our capabilities with needs that cannot be met and the desire to consume more than we have. On the basis of mobilizing every capability that can be mobilized, we must establish a correct distribution policy with a view toward carrying out the three strategic tasks set forth in the resolution of the 5th Party Plenum.

To accomplish this, it is clear that we must readjust the tools of distribution (financial activities, credit, prices, wages, social welfare and so forth).

b) We must firmly adhere to the central task throughout the period of transition, namely, socialist industrialization. To achieve socialist industrialization, we must accumulate capital. At present, because productivity and the returns from production are low, national income is not providing the accumulated capital needed for expanded reproduction. In the next several years, we must do everything possible to overcome this situation. National income must meet every consumer need and begin to accumulate capital from within the economy.

The sources of accumulated capital for socialist industrialization and the sources of capital needed to carry out the three strategic tasks mentioned above can only be found in making full use of our labor, natural resources and existing material-technical bases, in working in a diligent, disciplined and productive manner, in waging a difficult struggle and pursuing a policy of strict frugality (in production and construction, in administration and national defense, even in everyday life).

Capital for expanded reproduction at this time, especially for large-scale industry, must come through cooperation with the socialist countries within CEMA. For this reason, accumulated capital must be used in a highly effective manner before we can increase the rate of development of production, repay our debts and earn a profit. We cannot tolerate the present waste of investment capital and the uneconomical use of this capital. Utmost importance must be attached to acquiring and effectively using capital from foreign countries (through cooperation, credit, exports and so forth); however, we must not develop the thinking of relying upon these countries, rather, we must rely upon the development of domestic sources of capital, that is, accumulated capital must come primarily from within the national economy.

c) Stabilizing and gradually improving the standard of living of the people is a very pressing task.

Because the level of production is still low and labor productivity is also low, our people are still encountering numerous difficulties in their everyday lives. The most serious difficulties are being faced in the daily lives of law abiding persons (manual workers and cadres) and the farmers in a number of areas ravaged by continuous natural disasters and areas in which fighting has occurred.

We are in a vicious circle: productivity is low, the level of production and the level of purchasing activities are low and difficulties are being encountered in everyday life. The problem we face is that of reducing these difficulties, stabilizing and then gradually improving the standard of living. The contradiction between the level of production and the need to improve the standard of living arises as soon as the matter is raised because, generally speaking, we are not producing enough food to support the present standard of living. This matter cannot be resolved in some general, theoretical fashion but only resolved on the basis of analyzing in detail both needs and realistic capabilities during each period of time.

Although the people, in general, are encountering difficulties in their everyday lives, in terms of the impact upon production and society, the most serious and pressing problems are found in the daily lives of manual workers, cadres and laborers who earn their living legitimately. Until we are able to improve the standard of living of all the people, we must look for every way to reduce the difficulties and improve the lives of these persons in order to create initial incentives (combined with educational measures) for raising labor productivity and lay the basis for continuing to improve the standard of living.

d) The funds spent on consumption absolutely must come from within the scope and capabilities of the economy. Among these capabilities (which will change as we move forward) is that of reformulating the policy regarding distribution for consumption. We must make use of all tools of distribution (prices, wages, bonuses, taxes, social welfare and so forth) to insure close coordination among the three types of interests (of society, of the collective and of the individual worker), thoroughly implement the principle of distribution in accordance with labor and protect the interests of manual workers, farmers and other legitimate laborers.

It must be understood that only by establishing a correct relationship among the three types of interests can the economy develop. The distribution policy must fully embody this principle. If we emphasize only one relationship, we will fail to develop upon and even impede the basic moving force behind our society, namely the system of collective ownership of the working people.

Our distribution policies fail to coordinate the three types of interests and reduce the enthusiasm of manual workers, collective farmers and laborers who earn a legitimate living for productive labor. Therefore, using the various tools of distribution to regulate the incomes of the various strata of the people, especially regulate the incomes of speculators and smugglers and the excessively high income resulting from activities on the "free" market must be considered a very important

measure in protecting the interests of those who earn their livings legitimately and in guiding and providing incentive for productive labor in accordance with the guidelines of the plans and policies of the state, thereby helping to overcome the negative phenomena that exist now.

In view of the fact that the consumption fund is still very limited, expenditures on welfare must be very reasonable and effective in order to increase the funds for distribution in accordance with labor with a view toward providing strong incentive for productive labor and work. To accomplish this, we must abolish the present policy of sweeping subsidies; on the other hand, we must reduce the construction of non-production projects, determinedly suspend the construction of projects that do not yield practical benefits, reduce the administrative and professional apparatus and costs in order to provide more persons for production and reduce the consumer goods fund for these apparatus in order to increase the quantity of goods for distribution to workers.

e) At present, our country constantly faces the threat of a war unleashed by the Beijing reactionary authorities. We must constantly concern ourselves with strengthening the national defense system. The need for national defense expenditures reduces our ability to accumulate capital and improve the standard of living and demand that our people endure shortages and make sacrifices; therefore, it is even more necessary to make highly efficient use of accumulated capital, the consumption fund and the national defense fund.

7. We Must Expand the Business of Socialist Commerce, Improve the Management of the Market and Become Skilled in the New Method of Doing Business

a) When there is a system of commodity production and distribution in accordance with labor in the form of wages and the manday, the circulation of commodities and market activities are inevitable. Organizing the circulation of goods under the conditions of an economy in which many segments still exist and there is an imbalance between supply and demand is a complex problem. If the circulation of goods is not organized well, it will become chaotic.

Both theory and practice have shown, and our party has thoroughly implemented Lenin's thinking, that we must not destroy commerce but know how to use it to restore and develop production, to align with the class of farmers, to use the hands of the capitalists and small producers, to successfully carry out the struggle over "who defeats whom" and to build socialism. Our party has adopted the line of carrying out the transformation of commerce and building a unified socialist market, a line which reflects the structure of our country's market during the period of transition:

--The organized market (or socialist market) consists of state-operated commerce and collective commerce and has the tasks of purchasing and supplying goods in accordance with the state plan and at stable state prices or doing business outside the state plan at negotiated prices.

--The unorganized market or the "free" market: here, it is necessary to make the following distinctions:

--The rural market style free market is a place where producers (cooperatives, farmers, artisans and handicraftsmen) trade, buy or sell commodities to consumers; this market has existed for a long time as part of the unified socialist market;

--The free market in which merchants operate exists as long as private production exists (small owners, capitalists and private individuals). This market is only reduced in size and abolished gradually on the momentum of the victory of socialist transformation and the development of the system of large-scale socialist production.

--Within the free market, there are still "black markets" which engage in the following illegal activities: speculation and smuggling. These "black markets" must be eradicated, the sooner the better.

We advocate the expansion of the organized market because it is an important component of socialist transformation and socialist construction; at the same time, we recognize the existence, within a specific scope, of the unorganized market. All tendencies to rapidly abolish the "free" market or, conversely, to allow it to grow are harmful to the development and management of the socialist economy.

b) The socialist state must manage the entire social market and, instead of allowing the "free" market to grow, must control, lead and transform it by means of economic, administrative and educational measures (expanding the business of socialist commerce, collecting taxes, requiring business licenses, prohibiting merchants from doing business in goods controlled exclusively by the state, punishing speculators, smugglers and so forth). Economic measures must become the basis for managing the market. However, we will also be unable to manage the market if we rely solely upon economic measures. Conversely, if we apply administrative measures but do not coordinate them with economic and educational measures, we will not only fail to achieve the desired results, but also cause many other economic and social disruptions. Among the various economic measures, we must attach importance to expanding socialist commerce and revamping tax procedures.

c) Expanding socialist commerce is both a part of the construction of the socialist economy and a measure of decisive significance in transforming and managing the "free" market. It is also a way to establish the economic alliance of workers and farmers. Lenin considered trade to be the form of economic alliance most readily acceptable by farmers. If we do not expand socialist commerce and, as a result, do not establish an economic alliance with farmers, we will have abandoned the position of socialist commerce to the bourgeoisie and the factors of spontaneous capitalist development. Therefore, socialist commerce cannot withdraw to the scope of doing business in products that are under the exclusive management of the state and are distributed in accordance with the plan, rather, it must expand its activities in all three areas: purchases, wholesale sales and retail sales, especially purchases to control the sources of goods by means of both modes, supplying products and socialist business both in and outside the plan, and at both types of prices, directed prices and negotiated prices (or business guarantee prices). Here, it is necessary to review the profound teaching of Lenin: communists must learn how to do business (in the new, civilized way), learn from capitalists and from ordinary merchants; we must begin with the ABC's, not be the least bit arrogant over the achievements of the

past, recognize that we lack education, knowledge and skill, pay the "tuition fee" in order to study, in order to learn how to operate and meet the challenge, pass the "test" of the people and life in a successful manner. This teaching of Lenin is totally applicable to our circumstances at this time because it offers a way by which we can gain the participation of farmers in the economic field (most importantly in the purchasing of agricultural products) so that we can win victory over the bourgeoisie, especially bourgeois merchants, manage the market, expand and consolidate the position of socialism and, in the end, resolve the question of "who defeats whom."

Revamping tax procedures is a way to combat the underpayment of taxes, increase the sources of capital for the state and regulate the incomes of the various strata of the people as well as effective measure for guiding, inspecting and managing the free market. Giving light attention to this work will cause significant harm to the economy and everyday life.

d) In the recent past, we have displayed weaknesses in both directions. At some places and times, we have applied crude administrative measures to abolish the "free" market. As a result, we have impeded circulation and had a negative impact upon production and everyday life. The most widespread shortcoming has been for socialist commerce to draw back, be passive and lax in the face of the "free" market. We have not properly coordinated the three types of measures in order to manage the market and centralize the sources of goods in the hands of the state. Economic measures have been inappropriate, rigid and restrictive; administrative measures have been weak, rightist, lax and so forth. As a result of these shortcomings, poor results have been achieved in the effort to control the sources of goods through purchases; commodities and supplies are lost and stolen and disappear by many different paths; the "free" market has encroached upon the organized market and speculation and smuggling are spreading; the socialist market is showing a tendency to be shrinking; state-operated commerce is restricted to the narrow scope of supplying products under ration coupons and has not expanded its business activities, consequently, it is not providing good support and the struggle against the "free" market has been almost entirely neglected.

Then, which tendency must we combat the most? Which tendency is most dangerous?

This is perhaps a suitable time to recall a very interesting statement made by Stalin when someone asked of him: which deviation is more dangerous? Stalin replied in general: the most dangerous deviation is to stop struggling. At present, both tendencies are seen in our country at one time or another, on one echelon or another, on the part of one person or another. Every tendency, be it "leftist" or "rightist," can become serious and have a harmful effect if we do not promptly criticize and overcome it, thereby giving it an opportunity to develop.

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DEFENSE INDUSTRIES MUST ALSO PRODUCE CONSUMER GOODS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial: "National Defense Enterprises To Produce Consumer Goods"]

[Text] The main tasks of national defense enterprises are to produce and repair in the service of national defense and to ensure that the armed forces are technically fit for combat readiness and victory. In fulfilling very properly that paramount task, defense enterprises also must--and facts amply show that they can--turn out industrial goods for consumption and export, thus actively contributing to socialist construction.

In recent days many defense enterprises, wisely linking production of economic goods to defense production, have exceeded the latter's norms, and at the same time they have produced economic goods for domestic use and export. They have provided not just the usual consumer goods prized by the armed forces and the people, but also high-technology articles, directly serving a number of major branches of industrial production across the country. This has come about because cadres and workers clearly understand their commitment and because the enterprises have made orderly estimates, have fully and rationally availed themselves of labor capability and of technical equipment in each factory and shop, and have thriftily but fully used raw materials and scrap, expanding social material wealth while concretely improving the living conditions of enterprises and individual laborers. This is also an aspect of the policy of associating economy with national defense--to simultaneously produce for defense, domestic consumption, and export, in contributing to the present task of building and defending the nation.

In national defense enterprises there are, in general, plenty of discarded materials, ranging from wood, cloth, and plastics to metals. These wastes can and must be fully used to produce commodities catering to the needs of the armed forces and the people. Moreover, in producing economic goods, defense enterprises must thoroughly cash in on a stronger point: a quite high technical level as shown by mechanical equipment and craftsmanship, and a capability and tradition of ensuring product quality. Proper handling of that advantage will enable any enterprise to produce appropriate economic goods--not just usual ones assembled with available scraps but, when discarded materials are short, and in cooperation with friendly enterprises, localities, and organs, stable articles with higher quality and in greater quantity, in accordance with the state plan.

As with production for combat and combat readiness, the production in national defense enterprises of goods for the economy does require mandatory planning, with concrete norms and clear-cut policies and guidelines. In this manner, a negative impact on the fulfillment of the main task can be avoided, as well as the inclination to focus incorrectly and inordinately on consumer goods and on short-term and local interests, to the detriment of existing common laws and regulations and of the task of defense production.

AGRICULTURE

LIST OF 18 RECOMMENDED WINTER SUBSIDIARY CROPS PUBLISHED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 28 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Engineer Hong Thanh: "Our Winter Crop Plants"]

[Text] Grain Crops

1. Potato: Has become a main crop in the northern delta; yields more than 10 tons per hectare; its growth time is 95-100 days.

Sowing and planting time: In the delta, midland, and low-lying warm mountainous areas, from early October through early November. In the 4th Region, it is planted in November.

2. Sweet potato: There are many sweet potato crops in a year. Sweet potatoes have a relatively stable yield, do not require much expense on cuttings, and do not require high-intensive farming techniques as do potatoes.

Winter sweet potatoes are planted in September-October and harvested in February-March of the following year. The Hoang Long, Chiem Dau, Institute I...are short-term, high-yielding varieties quite suitable for winter planting.

3. Winter corn: Includes short-term varieties of corn, with growth period varying from 90 to 105 days. Sowing and planting time: In the delta, midland, and low-lying warm mountainous areas, sowing takes place from 10 through 20 September, or early October at the latest. In the 4th Region, sowing time spans from late September through 15 October. Winter corn is not grown in higher mountainous areas.

Winter Beans

Strong development of winter beans through crop rotation, crop mixing, and crop overlapping--that is, to plant an additional crop overlapping a preceding and a subsequent one--will bring about high economic efficiency and will appropriately contribute to soil enrichment. We have quite a few winter bean varieties.

1. Winter soybean: A valuable food crop providing a source of high protein content for man and animal husbandry, it is planted from 20 September through 10 October.

2. French kidney bean: Yellow pod, small as well as big seeds of black color; or green pod with brown kidney-shaped seeds. Sowed in September, October, and November, and harvested in January, February, and March.
3. Brown bean: Small, light brown seeds. Large-scale planting of that fairly high-yielding variety can yield 25-30 quintals of pods per hectare and 35-40 quintals of stems.
4. White bush bean: White seeds; unripe pods can be harvested; stalks can be used to prepare soup. Grown for its seeds. Mixed planting with corn is very good. Growth time varies between 100-110 days. It can yield 5-8 quintals of seeds per hectare.
5. Yunnan bean: Seeds of cafe-au-lait color; a climbing plant; early sowing in September and October. The main crop is sowed in January-February. Growth time is 120 days. Many crops a year.
6. Garden pea: Fond of relatively low temperatures. Sowing time takes place in November; growth time is 100 days. Both pod and stalk are edible.

Winter Vegetable Crops

1. Tomato: Highly nutritious food. Yield averages 15-18 tons per hectare. We have created well-known tomato-growing areas in Hanoi, Ha Bac, Hai Phong, Hai Hung, and Ha Nam Ninh. Tomatoes are also a valuable crop for export. Winter tomatoes are sowed on 15 September, and transplanted on 15 October.
2. Mustard: There are many varieties of mustard, fit for planting in many places. Growth time varies from 40-50 days to 3-4 months. Yield averages 15-30 tons per hectare. Sowed from September through October; transplanted from October through November.
3. Cabbage: An imported tropical vegetable, it has long been grown in the northern part of our country. Cabbage is a main winter vegetable crop. It yields 30-40 tons per hectare. Sowing time takes place from August through October; transplanting time spans from December through January.
4. Turnip-cabbage: It is widely grown during the winter season. There are many varieties of turnip-cabbage, with big or small corms. The variety showing a small stem, a round but rather flat corm, and a thin peel, has a medium growth time, high yield, and good quality. With proper intensive farming, turnip cabbage can yield 18-20 tons of corms per hectare. Winter turnip-cabbage is sowed from September through October, transplanted from October through December, and harvested from December through February.
5. Cauliflower: It comes from the warm and humid Mediterranean coast. Its unblooming flower serves as food for man. Yields an average 9-10 tons per hectare. Winter cauliflower is sowed from October through November and transplanted from November through December.
6. Cucumber: A high-yielding vegetable averaging 10-18 tons per hectare, cucumber is grown in many localities for export purposes. In recent years, besides our own

varieties we have also grown a number of high-yielding varieties from Japan. Cucumbers are sowed from September through December.

7. Watermelon: A good export crop, watermelon is planted from 10 September through 20 September.

8. Onion: A cold-climate vegetable, it is grown for its corms averaging 200-300 gr. Many places in our country have produced corms weighing 1 kg. It has high yield: from 20-30 tons per hectare. Onion planting: sowing from October through November; soil requires preparation; furrows must be 20 cm in height and 1.4 m in width. Shoots 40-60 days old are ready for replanting; there must be a 15 x 20 cm interval between replanted shoots.

In recent years, a number of localities have grown onions for export, achieving a high economic value.

9. Garlic: Both leaves and corms are edible. Growth time approximates 100 days. Garlic is also a valuable export crop. In addition, it is used in medicine to prevent flu.

Winter garlic is planted from 20 September through 10 October.

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THANH HOA PLANS BIG WINTER CROPS FOLLOWING FLOOD DAMAGES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: " Thanh Hoa Overcomes Aftermath of Flood, Grows Crops in Biggest Winter Season"]

[Text] Typhoon No 6 with strong winds and heavy rains caused serious damages in Thanh Hoa Province's agricultural production and affected the people's everyday life. Fifty thousand hectares of the tenth-month rice were flooded, with 26,800 hectares suffering from total losses. With the spirit of doing things on their own initiative and solidarity and mutual help, the party members and people of Thanh Hoa are bravely overcoming the aftermath of the flood and quickly stabilizing production and other activities. The principal and urgent task of the province is to concentrate manpower on saving the rice crop, protecting and taking good care of rice and subsidiary food crops and stepping up winter production. It has been mobilizing all labor forces and means (both manual and mechanized) to drain water, to fight the flood, to save the rice crop and to quickly restore the power supply network for flood control work. It succeeded in saving 30,000 hectares of the tenth-month rice from being flooded. Some tenth-month rice areas were infested by rice army worms (*Spodoptera mauritia*) and army worms (*Cirphis unipuncta*). Cadres were sent from districts to assist production installations and more tools (insecticide spray containers) were provided for the prevention and control of the harmful insects. The winter season this year would be a big one to compensate for the losses in the tenth-month rice crop season; efforts would be made to grow crops in from 50,000 to 60,000 hectares, an increase of from 18,000 to 28,000 hectares over 1979, with attention being paid to extending the areas of sweet potato, corn and potato and launching a widespread movement to produce sweet potato cuttings -- by now there are 6,500 hectares of land producing potato cuttings. Efforts are being made to have by 20 October 7,000 hectares of potato cuttings, to ensure the cultivation of from 27,000 to 30,000 hectares of sweet potato, or 10,000 hectares more than the 1979 winter crop season. More than 30 cadres went to assist the production installations in learning the technique of producing cuttings. For the newly-used areas, the province was selling 2 kilograms of nitrate fertilizer for every quintal of cuttings. A

cooperative member's family was paid 10-12 man-days for every quintal of cuttings it sold to the cooperative. State farms have supplied the cooperatives with 700 tons of sweet potato cuttings.

About the projected cultivation of 6,000 hectares of potato, 500 tons of cuttings have been purchased and transported to the production installations. In addition, the province intends to grow 7,000 hectares of winter corn; the remaining areas are for vegetables and leguminous plants. The crop seeds corporation in the province has imported 1.5 tons of vegetable seeds and 32 tons of short-term corn seeds.

The villages that were not affected by the flood have launched a movement to contribute vegetable, squash and winter melon seeds.

With 430 tractors being used in soil preparation, wherever harvesting has been done soil is prepared for growing winter crops; collectives, laborers and families of cooperative members are working together under contract with economic and technical norms to be fulfilled.

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PROGRESS IN CULTIVATION OF TENTH-MONTH RICE REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Oct 80 p 1

[VNA News Release: " The North Harvests 36,400 Hectares of Early Tenth-Month Rice, 3.2 Percent of Cultivated Area, and Grows Over 33,000 Hectares of Winter Vegetables and Subsidiary Food Crops; the South Basically Fulfills Its Tenth-Month Rice-Growing Plan and Harvests 452,000 Hectares of Summer and Autumn Rice, With Considerable Yield Obtained in Some Localities"]

[Excerpt] In addition to applying fertilizer and preventing and controlling harmful insects and diseases for their rice crop, particularly the plants that had been transplanted late, the agricultural cooperatives in the northern provinces and municipalities are concentrating their manpower on quickly and neatly harvesting the early rice that has ripened and preparing the soil for growing winter vegetables and subsidiary food crops. According to the General Department of Statistics, as of 5 October, the North has harvested more than 36,400 hectares of tenth-month and upland rice, or 3.2 percent of the cultivated area, and has grown more than 33,570 hectares of winter vegetables and subsidiary food crops, including over 4,000 hectares of corn, 19,000 sweet potato, 9,500 vegetables of various kinds, 100 potato and 660 soybean. Generally speaking, the pace of growing the winter crops has been slow as compared with schedule requirements because of rains and wet soil that prevented any planting.

This year although many localities had actively made relatively early preparations for winter crop production by getting seeds, capital, materials, vehicles and machines as they were striving to reach high cultivated areas, yields and volumes of production in order to compensate for the damages caused by natural calamities to their tenth-month rice crop, the rains in early October which made the soil wet did slow down the pace of their work. According to cultivation schedule the deadline for growing corn and sweet potato is 15 October in the delta provinces and 25 October in the Zone 4 provinces, but so far the cultivation of the two crops has been only 10-16 percent of the projected cultivated area. Taking advantage of the sunny weather, the localities that have a lot of land on river banks, particularly along the banks of Red and Thai Binh Rivers, are

concentrating manpower and draft power on preparing the soil wherever water has receded for cultivation of corn and sweet potato and trying to reach the projected cultivated area. About the potato crop, this winter crop season the provinces plan to grow 135,000 hectares, but all localities generally are short of cuttings. According to reports from the provinces that have large areas for winter cultivation, such as Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh, Vinh Phu and Haiphong, there are only nearly 80,000 tons of potato cuttings now. In a number of localities the quality of germinating tubers is not so good as many of them are rotten and infested by plant lice. If the cooperatives do not strengthen their control of harmful insects and plant lice to protect the tubers to be used to produce cuttings, they will not be able to reach the level of area as projected.

As of 5 October, the southern provinces and municipalities (Quang Nam-Da Nang and all provinces south of here) have basically fulfilled the plan for cultivation of nearly 2 million hectares of the tenth-month rice, well ahead of this same time last year. This year the weather has been favorable, with the supply of water being sufficient lately, and generally speaking the rice and subsidiary food crops in the south have been growing nicely. Right in the beginning of the crop season, as farmers cleaned up the fields well, had experience in preventing and controlling green leafhoppers and extended the cultivated areas by growing new rice varieties, the areas infested by green leafhoppers sharply decreased as compared with previous crops.

The southern provinces and municipalities have also harvested 452,000 hectares of summer and autumn rice, or 73 percent of the total cultivated areas of such crops. An Giang, Cuu Long, Quang Nam-Da Nang and Nghia Binh Provinces have completed the harvest of the crops. On the basis of the harvested areas, Thuan Hai obtained 33.3 quintals per hectare, Minh Hai 29 quintals, An Giang 26 quintals, Kien Giang and Long An 24 quintals. The provinces are concentrating manpower on quickly and neatly harvesting the summer and autumn rice crops and preparing for the winter-spring crop season.

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FIVE-YEAR GRAIN QUOTAS SET FOR NORTHERN DISTRICTS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 15 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "Results of Mobilizing Grain in 1980 Fifth-Month and Spring Season in Northern Provinces; Steady Grain Obligation Quotas for 5 Years Assigned to Districts"]

[Text] According to the Ministry of Food, almost all northern provinces and municipalities have assigned to districts the steady grain quotas they calculated for them to meet in the next 5 years. Hai Hung and Hanoi assigned the official quotas to the agricultural cooperatives before the harvest of the fifth-month and spring rice crop. Ha Son Binh, Ha Bac, Bac Thai, Binh Tri Thien, Thanh Hoa and Hoang Lien Son have completed the calculations and set the quotas for their agricultural cooperatives. Other provinces are making calculations so as to assign steady obligation quotas before the harvest of the tenth-month rice crop. In the localities where steady quotas were assigned, farmers have been feeling assured and the cooperatives have fulfilled the grain obligation quickly and neatly.

As of 30 September, throughout the north the grain taken into state storehouses amounted to 89.4 percent of the preliminary harvest of the fifth-month and spring crop and equaled to 50.1 percent of the total amount to be mobilized in the entire year of 1980. Collection of agricultural taxes amounted to 49.1 percent of the figures set for the entire year; purchases according to two-way economic contracts amounted to 57.4 percent and purchases at agreed prices 25.4 percent of the delivery quotas planned for the entire year; collection of debt payments was poor (only over 6 percent of the debts to be collected). Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh, Ha Bac, Hanoi, Cao Bang and Son La surpassed the level of preliminary purchases of the fifth-month and spring crop obligation quotas by 7-25 percent. In the north, 88 districts and cities and 2,130 cooperatives surpassed such levels; 15 cooperatives fulfilled their obligation for the entire year of 1980.

Hai Hung Province reached 113 percent of the level of preliminary purchases of the fifth-month and spring rice (the obligation share amounted to 110.7 percent of the assigned quotas); the average amounts mobilized were 586 kilograms of paddy

per hectare and 46 kilograms per capita. Cam Binh and Tu Loc Districts mobilized 849 and 673 kilograms of paddy per hectare. Binh Minh, Tan Viet, Lai Cach, Cam Dinh, Cao An, Kim Giang and Thai Hoa Cooperatives (in Cam Binh District), Dang Le Cooperative (in Kim Thi District), etc. contributed an average of from 1,300 to 1,564 kilograms of paddy per hectare.

Some districts which had high per capita contributions (50-62 kilograms) and contributions per hectare (688-888 kilograms) were Dong Hung and Kien Xuong (in Thai Binh Province), Hai Hau and Nghia Hung (in Ha Nam Ninh Province), etc.

The coordination among the sectors that supplied materials and goods and purchased grain was not so tight yet; 16 of 19 provinces and municipalities did not sell as much grain as they received materials, and 3 provinces purchased large quantities while receiving not enough materials for their own consumption. The way of exchanging nitrate fertilizer for farmers' paddy, which was purchased at agreed prices, was not yet widely applied. The putting of grain into storehouses was done quickly and neatly in many provinces, which was suitable for the expanded purchasing network. In most cases the paddy that was put into storehouses did comply with the standard for quality.

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